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ABSTRACT 
Forty years ago, U.S. President Richard Nixon declared war on drugs.  From the 
beginning, the United States has pursued a strategy focused on the supply-side of the 
issue, emphasizing eradication, interdiction, and incarceration and has pressured the 
government of Mexico to employ the same strategy at every opportunity. Over the course 
of time, the U.S. and Mexican governments pursued the strategy dictated by Washington 
to relatively little effect. Now, in the face of increasing power and autonomy among the 
cartels, Mexico has acted independently to combat the rising levels of violence.  Despite 
the apparent absence of pressure from the U.S., or evidence of likely success, Mexico still 
took action straight out of the U.S. playbook.  This thesis will examine why that has been 
the case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE 
WAR ON DRUGS  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
U.S. President Richard Nixon sent a ―Special Message to the Congress on Control 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs‖ on July 14, 1969.1  That document, for all intents and 
purposes, committed the United States to the ―war on drugs.‖  Since then, the U.S. has 
provided support in the form of monetary, military, and intelligence resources intended to 
aid governments with interdiction and eradication projects.  In the effort to fight the war, 
U.S. policies have included sending special equipment, providing tools and training, and 
creating specialized law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and in allied countries, 
dedicated to pursuing, prosecuting and incarcerating individuals and groups at all levels 
of the illicit trade.  Despite these efforts, the ―war on drugs‖ seems to have had only 
limited success; available quantities of drugs have not been reduced in any significant 
way, prices have steadily declined, and purity has not been adversely affected.2  At the 
same time, violence perpetrated by organized crime has increased in the region, 
particularly in Mexico.3  This inability to curtail the challenge posed by drug trafficking 
organizations poses an interesting puzzle.  Has there been any fundamental change in 
policies and strategies used by governments to deal with drug trafficking since 1969, 
when the war on drugs was officially declared?  Rather changed or not, have these 
strategies contributed to the success or failure of U.S. and Mexican policies?  For 
purposes of definition, a change of strategy requires more than a rhetorical shift.  A real 
strategic change would involve significant deviation from the supply-oriented paradigm.  
Increasing fiscal expenditure on demand-oriented programs like prevention, education 
                                                 
1 Richard M. Nixon, ―Special Message to the Congress on the Control of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs‖ (July 14, 1969). 
2 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Counternarcotics Policy Overview: Global Trends & Strategies, Partnership 
for the Americas Commission, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 2; John M. Walsh, Are We 
There Yet? Measuring Progress in the U.S. War on Drugs in Latin America. WOLA Drug War Monitor 
(Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2004), 4. 
3  Angelica Duran-Martinez, Gayle Hazard, and Viridiana Rios, 2010 Mid-Year Report on Drug 
Violence in Mexico, Justice in Mexico Project, (San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 2. 
 2 
and treatment to match or exceed expenditures on enforcement, eradication and 
interdiction, or radical adjustments like legalization of controlled substances would be 
indicative of an actual change in strategy.  The question of success is somewhat harder to 
pin down.  Goals specified by the Obama administration in the 2010 U.S. National Drug 
Control Strategy tend to be modest; a 15 percent over five-year reduction in usage by 
young people, similar reductions for chronic users.4  Others, like the first President Bush, 
see success in more absolute terms; complete eradication or elimination of the trade.5  If 
success is hard to define, failure is not.  Increased availability, reduced prices, steady 
purity and increased violence are, for my purposes, indicative of failed and failing 
policies. 
This thesis will examine Mexico‘s role in the drug war alongside the United 
States; specifically it will examine the strategic convergence of the two countries‘ anti-
narcotics policies and their enhanced bilateral cooperation since 1969.  It ultimately asks 
the question: why have the two countries moved together in the pursuit of a strategy that 
has not equated to success in the drug war?  Studying bilateral drug policies should 
enable us to identify lessons learned and more effectively coordinate efforts aimed at 
drug trafficking.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The current U.S. anti-narcotic regime traces its roots back to a critical juncture in 
1969, when narcotic trafficking was recognized as a threat to national security and ―war‖ 
was declared against drug traffickers.  What started primarily as a concern with heroin 
and marijuana during the 1970s, evolved during the 1980s to focus on the Colombian 
cocaine trade that transited through the Caribbean basin and entered South Florida.  
When U.S. interdiction efforts met with localized success in the Caribbean, the 
remarkably adaptable cocaine trade migrated to Mexico where today it accounts for as 
                                                 
4 U.S. Executive Office of the President and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, National 
Drug Control Strategy 2010, (Washington DC: the White House, 2009), 1. 
5 George H.W. Bush, ―Speech on National Drug Control Strategy.‖ New York Times, September 06, 
1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/06/us/text-of-president-s-speech-on-national-drug-control-
strategy.html?scp=2&sq=&pagewanted=all, (accessed February 26, 2011). 
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much as 90 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S.6  Drug trafficking organizations, 
based primarily in Mexico continue to ship literally tons of illicit drugs to the U.S.  The 
enormous profit of this illegal industry fuels extreme violence, corruption and, not 
insignificantly, feeds the addiction of an estimated 13 to 20 million Americans.7   
The significance of the bilateral U.S.-Mexican fight against drug traffickers 
cannot be overstated.  Viewed from the U.S. perspective, in terms of opportunity costs 
from fighting the war on foreign shores to the cost of arrest, prosecution and 
incarceration within our own borders, the drug trade has cost the United States billions of 
dollars.8  The Mérida Initiative (the latest in a long series of programs) accounts for more 
than a billion dollars of U.S. aid by itself.  Beyond mere financial interest, Mexico has 
even more at stake.  With drug-related murders exceeding 28,000 since President 
Calderón‘s 2006 inauguration and over 6,000 per year in 2008 and 20099 alone, the 
violence threatens the very legitimacy of the Mexican state.10 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Looking at the results of the last forty years of the drug war, most conclude that 
there has been little real progress.  Availability is virtually unhindered, prices are lower, 
purity of the supply is unchanged,11 all of which indicates that the situation has not 
improved.  Against such metrics, there are three possibilities regarding the latest efforts 
to combat drug trafficking.  The first is that President Calderón‘s program, as supported 
by the Mérida Initiative, represents a significant strategic change in U.S.-Mexico efforts 
                                                 
6 Hal Brands, Mexico‟s Narco-insurgency and U.S. counter drug policy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2009), 5; Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, "Mexico: The Militarization Trap." In Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: the impact of US policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 263–302 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 271; Shannon O‘Neil, "The Real War in Mexico." Foreign Affairs vol. 88, 
no. 4 (2009), 66. 
7 George Grayson, Mexico‟s struggle with „Drugs and Thugs,‟ (New York: Foreign Policy 
Association, 2009), 60; Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars. (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2006), 49. 
8 The White House. National Drug Control Strategy . (FY 2009 Budget Summary, Washington, DC: 
The White House), 2008. 
9 Duran-Martinez, et al. 2010 Mid-Year Report on Drug Violence in Mexico, 2. 
10 O‘Neil, "The Real War in Mexico,‖ 63–64. 
11 Felbab-Brown, Counternarcotics Policy Overview, 2; Walsh, Are We There Yet? 4. 
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to halt drug trafficking.  The second possibility is that the strategy represents more of the 
same and is likely to produce similar results: headline grabbing arrests, occasional 
seizures, but little else.  The third possibility is that the new implementation represents 
some middle ground; that reforms beyond additional enforcement are being pursued and 
that root issues are (finally) being addressed.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The conventional wisdom on anti-drug policies suggests that the drug war, as 
waged for the last forty years, has not met with especially favorable results.  The 
literature on the subject seems divided among those who claim little or no strategic 
evolution and those who see greater strategic variation across time. Vanda Felbab-Brown 
and Hal Brands argue that the war against drugs has been fought on U.S. soil, at the 
border, or closer to the source, but traditional tactics have been ineffective. They see little 
change in the strategic policy choices aimed at defeating the illicit trade.12  The opposing 
viewpoint, espoused by Luis Astorga and Laurie Freeman holds that recognition of the 
drug war as an explicit threat to U.S. national security by President Reagan changed the 
nature of the conflict from a law enforcement matter to a militarized fight.13 
Writing for the Brookings Institution, Vanda Felbab-Brown examined supply and 
demand focused policies used in implementing counternarcotics strategies.  The United 
States‘ consistent reliance on supply reduction tactics is seen in a twenty-one billion 
dollar annual expenditure on supply oriented strategies at home and abroad.  Looking at 
the traditional supply-side strategies of eradication, interdiction, and alternative 
livelihoods, she concludes that at best they netted some localized success, overall but 
they had a minimal impact in reducing narcotic trafficking.14   
While acknowledging that there are institutional issues in Mexico adding to the 
problem, Hal Brands‘ recent examination of the Mérida Initiative concludes that it is 
                                                 
12 Felbab-Brown, Counternarcotics Policy Overview, 2–3, 26; Brands, Narco-insurgency , vi. 
13 Luis Astorga. "Mexico: Drugs and Politics." The Political Economy of the Drug Industry. ed. 
Menno Vellinga, 85–102 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 93, 100; Freeman and Sierra, 
"Mexico: The Militarization Trap,‖ 277. 
14 Felbab-Brown, Counternarcotics Policy Overview, 2–3, 26. 
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more or less the same old supply-side attack.15  The Mérida Initiative ―symbolizes an old 
paradigm in U.S. counternarcotics policy.  In its emphasis on interdiction and 
enforcement initiatives, the Mérida Initiative is the latest incarnation of a longstanding, 
supply-side approach to the drug trade.‖16 
Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas describe the 
logic of a supply-side oriented strategy as compelling: eliminate the supply, eliminate the 
problem. Unfortunately, for largely political reasons, the U.S. continues to pour money 
on the problem while drugs remain cheap and readily available.17  In looking at the 
strategic choices made in this country, they argue that the U.S. strategy remains fixated 
(and failing) because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the fight.18 
Ultimately, most available literature on drug trafficking claims that there has been 
little or no change in strategies; supply side policies dominate all other alternatives.  They 
all acknowledge that within the boundaries of the supply-side, specific areas of emphasis 
have gained and lost favor over time.  However, in their view the pillars of eradication, 
interdiction, and enforcement have remained central to the war on drugs.  Their assertions 
that strategies have not changed is only accurate on the most macro level. 
By contrast, authors such as Luis Astorga, Laurie Freeman, and Jorge Luis Sierra 
argue that the strategy has become increasingly militarized since the 1980s.19  Astorga 
focuses on U.S. pressure on the Government of Mexico to militarize the drug war within 
Mexican borders.  For instance, during the Reagan administration, the U.S. Department 
of Defense began to participate in anti-drug activities.  Collaboration between the U.S. 
and the Mexican armed forces has increased across a wide array of cooperative efforts, 
including a critical one concerning anti-narcotic operations.  As a result, Mexico has 
increasingly favored a strategy that has relied on military involvement in enforcement 
                                                 
15 Brands, Narco-insurgency, vi. 
16 Ibid., 4. 
17 Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas, Drug War Politics: the Price 
of Denial, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 4. 
18 Bertram, et. al., Drug War Politics, 11. 
19 Astorga. "Mexico: Drugs and Politics.", 93, 100; Freeman and Sierra, "Mexico: The Militarization 
Trap,‖ 277. 
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and interdiction.  Unfortunately, in Astorga‘s view, changing strategy has not meant 
improved results.  ―An upward spiral of violence is to be expected in any case since the 
very logic of the repressive anti-drug policy inspired by the United States is in itself a 
dead-end street and will produce endless war.‖20  
On the other hand, institutionalist authors have looked at factors such as poverty, 
weak judiciary, and corruption in police organizations as causes of illegal drug trade.  
Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra see traditional enforcement as not attacking the 
―correct‖ problem.  For example, they indicate that U.S. efforts and Mexican attempts to 
reform police and judicial institutions might have been effective in the short term, but 
corruption at all levels of law enforcement undermines the whole strategy.  The 
unreliability of police agencies, combined with a U.S. bias toward militarization of 
Mexico‘s counter drug policies led to an increased reliance on the military to combat 
organized crime.21  Their chief concern was to illustrate what they perceived as a threat 
from the Fox administration‘s military reliant counternarcotics policies to Mexico‘s 
nascent democracy.22 
George Grayson, in recent works about the Mérida Initiative also writes about 
militarization.  In his view, Calderón was even more favorable to military involvement at 
the beginning of his term, yet he is now utilizing the armed forces to buy time for a 
thorough reform of the nation‘s police.23  He also argues that changes in the judiciary are 
evidence of a real strategic change of policy.24 
Contrary to the commonly held belief that U.S. strategy (and by extension, partner 
strategy) is static, Bob Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal argue that changing strategy is 
exactly the problem.  Citing former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) chief of operations 
Michael Braun, they claim that the specific strategy may be less important than a 
                                                 
20 Astorga, ―Mexico: Drugs and Politics,‖ 93, 100. 
21 Freeman and Sierra, ―Mexico: The Militarization Trap,‖ 277. 
22 Ibid., 294–296. 
23 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 143. 
24 Grayson, „Drugs and Thugs,‟ 41, 47. 
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consistent one. ―[U.S.] counter-drug strategy changes drastically with each 
administration, and it often changes in ways that significantly disrupt federal law 
enforcement‘s ability to fulfill the counter-drug mission safely and effectively.‖25 
Consequently, most of the available literature condemns the drug war in general 
and supply-centric strategies in particular as failed policies.  The literature quite often 
takes for granted U.S. pressures on Mexico to implement traditional eradication or 
interdiction based means.  Nevertheless, the literature tends to overlook or neglect 
Mexico‘s relative independence vis-à-vis the United States and the fact that even weaker 
states, like Mexico, have multiple choices available to deal with narcotics trafficking 
issues.  This thesis will attempt to fill in that gap by explaining why Mexico‘s choices 
have aligned with U.S. preferences despite that independence. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Principally, I will be surveying expert analysis appearing in scholarly work on the 
subject, but will also make use of primary sources in the form of newspapers and archival 
research. This thesis will utilize process-tracing26 to make a historical review of drug 
trafficking and its relationship to the various Mexican administrations over the last four 
decades.  It will frame the story in terms of structural and institutional arguments.  
The approach I will use is based on a case analysis, focusing on Mexico as my 
primary case study.  The Mexican case is illuminating not only because it borders the 
U.S. and faces a serious security challenge posed by drug trafficking, but it also provides 
multiple observations over time, allowing me to assess how changes in policies have been 
implemented. 
 
                                                 
25 Bob Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and US National Security 
(Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 51. 
26 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 205–232. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis seeks to show that although the bilateral relationship between the U.S. 
and Mexico has improved over the last forty years and that strategy for pursuing the war 
on drugs has become more and more aligned, there has been little actual progress toward 
winning the drug war. 
The objective of this thesis is to identify particular events that served to shape 
Mexico‘s strategic choices and how those changes were implemented.  This examination 
will explore the evolution of both Mexican counternarcotics strategies and the U.S. 
strategies; the two are so intricately intertwined, one cannot be examined except in the 
context of the other.  Ultimately, this examination should allow us to understand what 
causes the changes and the boundaries within which those changes are made. 
An examination of the Mexican government strategy after the U.S. ―declaration of 
war‖ against drugs in 1969, requires at least a basic understanding of the political 
environment and relationships that existed prior to that critical juncture.  The first section 
of this chapter will survey that environment from the time of the Mexican Revolution 
through the birth of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) until the 1969 shift in 
U.S. policy.  Due to the fact that Mexican sexenio does not correspond to U.S. 
presidential terms (six years for the Mexican Presidency versus a four-year term with the 
possibility of a second term in the U.S.) subsequent sections of the chapter will examine 
changes by decade.   
The section examining the 1970s spans two extremes of pressure from the U.S.; 
Nixon‘s hard core engagement and Carter‘s more relaxed approach.  The 1980s section 
focuses primarily on the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena and the 
fallout from those events.   The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would, 
at first glance, appear to provide the critical juncture for the 1990s and indeed it did have 
a significant role in the choices made by the Salinas administration.  However, in terms 
of long term impact, NAFTA was not as significant as the loss of power by the PRI.  The 
final decade examined, the 2000s, discusses the choices available in the face of 
increasing cartel violence. 
 9 
The concluding chapter of this thesis will summarize significant findings.  It will 
explain the bounded strategic choices made by President Calderón‘s administration 
utilizing elements of institutional arguments and rational choice theory.  The findings will 
have specific implications for U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics strategy as well as broader 
cross-border relations.  
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II. HISTORY OF THE DRUG TRADE  
A. EARLY YEARS (BEFORE THE BIRTH OF THE PRI 1969) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the early bilateral relations between the Mexico and the 
United States.  It surveys the early connections between drug trafficking and the Mexican 
political elite prior to the initial decision to treat trafficking as an issue that requires 
international cooperation.  By doing so, it will establish a baseline from which the 
subsequent choices and events may be assessed. 
2. Early Years Through the Start of Revolution (1800s–1910) 
Media pundits and talking heads seem to think that drug smuggling across the 
U.S. -Mexican border is a modern phenomenon.  On the contrary, contraband trafficking 
actually is as old as the border itself.27  From the mid 1800s until 1910, the border was 
little more than a line on the map.  People and products moved freely back and forth with 
little or no restriction; what little control there was aimed at restricting Chinese 
immigration into the U.S. rather than controlling cross-border travel by Mexican citizens.  
Border towns like El Paso, Brownsville, and Laredo were certainly associated with, if not 
founded by a Mexican Diaspora.28  Marijuana production, which was not considered 
criminal on either side of the border, has roots in Mexico at least back to the 1800s; in 
fact ―records show that Mexican marijuana has been exported to the United States since 
the nineteenth century.‖29  Marijuana cultivation and sale afforded employment 
opportunities for poor Mexicans on both sides of the border, particularly during and after 
the economically disruptive revolution.30 
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3. Revolution Through U.S. Prohibition: PRI Comes to Power (1911–
 1930s) 
The demise of the ―Porfiriato‖ in 1911 ignited the Mexican Revolution, which 
fostered the spread of the marijuana habit throughout the country.31  The United States 
first ―noticed‖ the problem on the Mexican border ―during General John Pershing‘s 
punitive expedition in pursuit of Pancho Villa (1916–1917), when it was estimated that 
thousands of the general‘s soldiers used narcotics while in Mexico.‖32  
Mexico‘s northern border states were the hub of smuggling activities and their 
loyalty to the new revolutionary central government was questionable at best.  The 
governor of Baja, California from 1914–1920 was Esteban Cantú.  Cantú amassed a 
small fortune from his illegal activities, not the least of which included smuggling opium, 
heroin, and cocaine.  Reacting to Cantú‘s defiance, Mexican President Venustiano 
Carranza (1917–1920) outlawed the opium trade in Baja in order to undermine Cantú‘s 
power.33 
The U.S. passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1919, 
combined with the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act and the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Law 
dramatically impacted U.S.-Mexican border relations. ―What at the beginning of the 
century constituted legal exports of minimal value soon became a significant smuggling 
activity and later turned into a black market problem.‖34  By the end of the 1930s, Harry 
J. Anslinger, director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN, a forerunner of the 
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and sale of marijuana illegal.35 Unfortunately, the U.S. sponsored prohibition regime 
―fostered the rise and consolidation of organized crime in Mexico as ‗rumrunners‘ 
prospered during the 1920s and 1930s.‖36   
Cantú was deposed and replaced by General Abelardo Rodriguez as governor of 
Baja.  Rodriguez ―took advantage of his position during the years of prohibition in the 
United States to make his fortune.  The possible conflict between organized crime and 
governability… was nullified by those in political power who controlled the largest 
illegal business.‖37  The union between criminal and politician was thus cemented.  
Northern governors, members of their staff and police agencies were associated with drug 
dealing from that time on.38 Others, like Enrique Fernández, known as the ―Al Capone of 
Ciudad Juarez,‖ may not have been a governor himself but his wealth from the drug trade 
afforded him tremendous influence with government officials.39 
Legitimate government and honest law enforcement faced an uphill battle from 
early on. ―The persistence of a lucrative trade, for which organizers could bribe officials 
and enforcers; at times the latter became active participants in the illegal business in a 
region (e.g., northern Mexico) where law and order were far from the rule.‖40 
The period from the end of ―Prohibition‖ through the end of the next decade was 
both interesting and complex.  The PRI had been firmly and exclusively in control of the 
Mexican government since 1929.  From the beginning, government and traffickers 
blurred the lines between them.  ―Ties between the PRI and illegal traders began in the 
first half of the twentieth century, during prohibition.  By the end of World War II, the 
relationship between drug traffickers and the ruling party had solidified. Through the 
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Mexican Ministry of the Interior and the federal police, as well as governorships and 
other political offices, the government established patron-client relationships with drug 
traffickers… This arrangement… defined the rules of the game for traffickers.‖41   
4. Gangster Era Through WWII (1930s–1945) 
The relationship was sometimes more flagrant than others.  Leadership of the 
Mexican Department of Health (DoH) acknowledged in 1937 that previously, ―the agents 
were paid with the drugs they seized, which, of course, they then sold.‖42  Shortly after, 
the Mexican government proposed the creation of a state-run monopoly to buy and 
distribute drugs.  ―This radical proposal from the Mexican Federal Narcotics Service 
(part of the DoH) to deal with drug smuggling and domestic use met with a U.S. embargo 
on all shipments of medical drugs to Mexico.‖43  The proposal quickly went away. 
Mexican drug traffickers (and government officials) were tied in the early 1940s 
to U.S. organized crime figures.  Prominent American gangsters like ―Mickey Cohen and 
Harold ―Happy‖ Meltzer—who had special contacts with Salvatore Duhart, the Mexican 
consul in Washington, who made arrangements with Mexican customs to traffic opium— 
and his associate Max Cossman‖ pursued involvement in Mexican drug trafficking. 44 
Furthermore, Federal Bureau of Narcotics chief Harry Anslinger claimed that ―[Bugsy] 
Siegel and Virginia Hill negotiated with Mexican politicians in order to be able to finance 
the cultivation of opium poppy in the northwestern part of the country.‖45 
Despite the corruption and the ties to the American underworld, World War Two 
proved the old adage that ―politics makes strange bedfellows‖.  Before World War Two, 
Mexico supplied probably less than fifteen percent of all heroin to the United States, but 
its market share increased dramatically when traditional European and Asian sources 
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were cut off by Axis forces.46  Rather uncharacteristically, the United States actually 
encouraged the Mexican government to legally cultivate Indian hemp (marijuana) for the 
manufacture of rope and opium poppies to facilitate production of medical morphine, 
both of which were available only in limited quantities, to support the Allied war effort.47 
After the war, production of these crops continued unabated. ―Factors that really 
contributed to the growth of heroin and marijuana production in Mexico after the war 
were the disruption of traditional heroin routes and an increase in U.S. marijuana 
consumption.‖48  Mexican officials were evidently eager to oblige.  Mexico City 
journalists identified General Pablo Macías Valenzuela, secretary of War and the Navy 
(1940–1942) and Sinaloa governor (1945–1950), as directing or protecting the opium 
trade in Sinaloa.  Culiacán, the capital of Sinaloa, was described during his rule as a ―new 
Chicago with gangsters in sandals.‖49  Valenzuela, of course, denied the allegations, 
claiming political enemies were smearing him.  ―The accusations against Valenzuela 
emerged during the preparation of the antidrug ―campaign‖ by the administration of 
[President] Miguel Alemán.‖50 
5. Post-World War, Pre-Drug War (1946–1969) 
Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946–1952) was a key figure in the expansion of ties 
between crime and government.  He established the Federal Security Directorate (DFS) 
which, in conjunction with the Attorney General‘s Office and the army, was supposed to 
combat forbidden commerce.  In actual practice, those officials often became 
intermediaries between drug traffickers and the seat of official power. ―Neither mediators 
nor traffickers boasted free reign: they were both subordinate to political power centered 
in state executives, who—in turn—answered to the president and his lieutenants.‖51 
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Named in a confidential document sent on September 4, 1947, by the U.S. 
Embassy, members of the DFS leadership, including close advisor of President Alemán, 
Senator Carlos Serrano (the true head of the DFS organization), official head of the DFS 
Marcelino Inurreta and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Magoral were accused of 
involvement in drug trafficking.52  Ultimately, Alemán‘s ―most lasting legacy was a 
reputation for graft and corruption on a scale heretofore unknown in Mexico.‖53 
Taken together, these anecdotes, like those presented by Luis Astorga would 
indicate a similar conclusion: that the vector of corruption moves from politicians toward 
criminals as opposed to the more commonly held belief that criminal elements sought to 
corrupt politicians. ―Mechanisms used by those in political office to control the business 
changed in the 1940s with the arrival of civilians in power.‖54 
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s continued to be a ―boom‖ time for illicit drug 
traders.  It is estimated that Mexican marijuana accounted for as much as seventy-five 
percent of the U.S. market (during this era, Mexican heroin hovered around a ten to 
fifteen percent market share, it did not increase dramatically until later).55 
Governor Macías Valenzuela, despite accusations in the Mexican press, 
completed his term as governor of Sinaloa in 1950 and remained in positions of power 
within the military hierarchy.  The next year, he was appointed to lead Military Region I, 
headquartered in the Valley of Mexico and in 1952 he commanded Military Camp 
Number One.  Although no longer in the state of Sinaloa, he apparently remained 
influential in the area. ―The main opium trafficker of the time, Miguel Urías Uriarte from 
Badiraguato [Sinaloa], was captured and released shortly thereafter… it was said that he 
was protected by the authorities.‖56  
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During that period, the Sinaloan press lobbied for a United Nations sanction of the 
state‘s opium crop.  ―The editor leading this newspaper campaign became the attorney 
general of Sinaloa in the early 1950s… the federal government would wage campaigns 
against the opium growers to placate the United States… At the same time, federal police 
officers dreamed of being assigned to Sinaloa because of the money to be made.‖57 
The use of the Mexican Army as eradication forces spanned from Baja California 
all the way to the Yucatán.  ―The campaign, as well as the cultivation of drugs had truly 
become national.‖58  Despite this level of focus, by the end of the first full ―post-war‖ 
decade Mexico‘s efforts to combat the drug trade were hampered not only by an often 
complicit government, but shortages of equipment and material as well.  ―In January 
1961, an interdepartmental report (in the U.S.) noted that virtually all illicit drugs on the 
American market originated in Mexico. It was not until late 1961, following an informal 
U.S.-Mexico meeting on the narcotics issue, that Mexico began to acquire the equipment 
it needed to conduct a more successful campaign… in the interim, however, demand 
grew exponentially.‖59  Between 1962 and 1967 marijuana use among 18 to 25 year-old 
Americans rose from four percent to thirteen percent; percentages of heroin use increased 
proportionally.60 
The fifties and sixties ushered in greater levels of violence, which ―grew in direct 
proportion to the increase in the demand for drugs, the expansion of the market, and the 
arrival of a new generation of traffickers.‖61  Typically, only low ranking police officers 
were targets but by the end of the 1960s, any restrictions were vanishing. ―Instead of 
mere agents or common soldiers, it was no longer rare—although not yet common 
either— for heads of judicial police or commanders to be killed... For example, Major 
Ramón 
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Virrueta Cruz, the head of the judicial police of Sinaloa, was killed in Culiacán on June 6, 
1969… however, there is widespread doubt about whether (he) died fulfilling (his) duties 
or because (he was) playing a double game.‖62  
The end of the sixties saw two other noteworthy events, one particular to drugs 
and crime, (and of particular interest to this thesis), the other indirectly related but 
significant in its long-term impact.  Some scholars trace the ultimate failure of the PRI as 
Mexico‘s power party to a 1968 government reaction to student protest that came to be 
known as the Tlatelolco Massacre in which government authorities opened fire on 
thousands of students and middle class demonstrators, killing or injuring hundreds.63  
Although the party remained in power for another thirty years, this ―beginning of the 
end‖ ultimately lead to the power vacuum that would eventually be filled by criminals 
when the political players were no longer in the game. 
The other event, more directly related occurred when U.S. President Richard 
Nixon (1969–1974) sent a ―Special Message to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs‖ on July 14, 1969.64  That document, for all intents and purposes 
committed the United States to the War on Drugs.  That commitment will be examined in 
more detail in the next chapter section. 
6. Concluding the Early Decades 
Looking at early efforts, then, where there was an effort against drug producers, it 
faced difficulties of inaccessibility, inadequate equipment availability (especially 
aircraft), violent reaction, and innovation on the part of traffickers.65  Almost invariably a 
response to U.S. pressure, the effectiveness was less than complete. 
More often, Mexican counterdrug strategy before 1969 (if one could call it a 
strategy) was not targeted at reducing the flow of drugs across the border or even at 
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incarcerating criminal actors.  If anything, it was primarily used as a tool to exert 
dominance over individual political opponents within the Mexican political system.  
Northern governors competed among each other and were in turn the target of control by 
federal government officials. 
B. 1970S (THE WAR BEGINS: 1969–1979) 
1. Introduction 
The decade following the ―declaration of war‖ established U.S. preference for a 
supply side orientation in its counternarcotics strategy.  Early, albeit temporary successes 
and the creation of an anti-drug bureaucracy cemented those preferences and from that 
point, the die was cast.  This section will illustrate that the beginning of Mexico‘s 
strategic approach was largely dictated by U.S. pressure and was followed when 
economic imperatives showed cooperation to be in the best interest of Mexico. 
2. Richard Nixon 
During his campaign for the presidency of the United States, Richard Nixon 
courted his ―Great Silent Majority‖ by appealing to a conservative, pro ―law and order‖ 
constituency, fearful of the social upheaval manifesting across the United States in the 
late 1960s.  Inescapably aware of a drug culture in the U.S., Nixon pledged during a 1968 
campaign swing through California, ―that, if elected, he would ‗move against the source 
of drugs.‘‖66  The drug war waged for the next forty years grew from this seed. 
In keeping this campaign promise, Nixon appointed two of his cabinet members 
(Attorney General John Mitchell and Treasury Secretary David Kennedy) to lead the 
Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs.  
The task force‘s report to the president, released June 6, 1969,  
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… singled out Mexico as the primary supplier of marihuana and a source 
for a large amount of other dangerous drugs, including heroin. According 
to the task force, Mexican free-lance smugglers and organized traffickers 
were ―largely responsible for the marihuana and drug abuse problem‖ that 
Nixon and his supporters so vehemently deplored.67 
Richard Kleindienst, a Deputy Attorney General and co-chairman of the task 
force, travelled to Mexico that same month in an attempt to secure the cooperation of the 
Mexican government in Nixon‘s war on drugs.  The meetings were polite but ultimately, 
the government of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) was unwilling to take any 
significant new steps to combat growers and smugglers.  Although they were in the 
process of executing their own eradication campaign, the Mexican representatives balked 
at the idea of implementing an aerial herbicidal defoliation program, advocated by the 
Americans. ―Several of the key American requests touched the very sensitive nerve of 
Mexican sovereignty, for they involved United States participation in exclusively 
Mexican internal affairs.‖68  An exasperated Kleindienst reported back to Attorney 
General Mitchell, ―I can tell you how you can get their attention.  Just close down the 
border.‖69 
The next month, President Nixon presented his Special Message to the Congress 
on the Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.  Delivered on July 14, 1969, it was 
effectively the opening salvo in the war on drugs.  In the message, Nixon committed the 
United States to an ambitious program involving federal and state legislative efforts, 
international cooperation, and interdiction of illegal import, suppression of trafficking, 
education, research, rehabilitation, training, and local law enforcement coordination.70 
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In the aftermath of President Nixon‘s declaration, the United States embarked on 
a unilateral counter drug effort known as Operation Intercept.  Mexico had been 
perceived as the principle supplier for marijuana in the American market and as such, the 
U.S. launched an enormous operation to cut that source off at the root.  Kleindienst‘s off-
hand remark to Mitchell was not literally the objective of Operation Intercept but in the 
end, the result was effectively the same. 
If, as publicly advertised, the objective of Operation Intercept was to eradicate 
Mexican drug trafficking, it was a colossally expensive failure.  In its twenty-day course, 
U.S. Customs and Border agents seized relatively little contraband.  The thirty million 
dollar price tag on the operation means that the 3,200-odd pounds of marijuana seized in 
the operation cost the American taxpayer a little over nine thousand dollars per pound.71 
On the other hand, if the intent was to get the attention of the Mexican 
government, for better or worse, it clearly achieved that goal.  The U.S. Army established 
a radar picket from El Paso to San Diego theoretically designed to interdict smuggling by 
air.  It was largely ineffective due to limited range on the radar and an almost non-
existent aviation arm of the Customs Service.72  More significantly, the customs and 
border patrol increased their presence to some two thousand agents at border crossings.73  
The daily routine of life in Mexican border cities was radically altered as 
massive traffic jams became the order of the day.  During Intercept‘s 
initial stage, traffic backed up for miles, radiators boiled over, tempers 
flared, and tourists fumed at being forced to wait as long as six hours to 
clear Customs.74   
Where previously, one vehicle in twenty was subjected to search, Operation 
Intercept implemented one hundred percent inspections; every vehicle, every pedestrian, 
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every bag or suitcase was thoroughly inspected.75  ―The two-week logjam of cars, trucks 
and pedestrians in this ‗nightmarish dragnet‘ wreaked economic chaos in the border 
zone.‖76 
Mexican reaction to Operation Intercept was both understandable and predictable.  
President Díaz Ordaz decried the breakdown of relations between the neighboring 
nations.  Some Mexican merchants tried to retaliate with Operation Dignity, ―a buy-at-
home campaign designed to indirectly force the Nixon administration to modify or 
terminate Operation Intercept.‖77  For various reasons, Operation Dignity was generally 
ineffective.  It was, however, indicative of the Mexican perception of Operation Intercept. 
―The entire project became ‗racist,‘ an ‗outrageous effrontery to human dignity,‘ a 
‗Berlin Wall.‘‖78 
Despite the protests and economic havoc wrought on both sides of the border, the 
Nixon administration stayed the course for almost a full three weeks until negotiators 
reached a mutually agreeable solution.  Nixon finally terminated Operation Intercept on 
October 10, 1969 in return for Mexican participation in a new joint enforcement venture 
to be known as Operation Cooperation.79 
Although Operation Intercept did little but cause hard feelings, it did have some 
positive impact.  Mexican officials grudgingly came to recognize their nation‘s own drug 
problems.  Additionally, it reinvigorated Mexico‘s own internal efforts to combat 
cultivation, processing and transport of drugs.  ―While Intercept proved a short-term 
diplomatic blunder, it indirectly and somewhat ironically became a long-term catalyst to 
an accelerated Mexican antidrug campaign and a springboard to more effective 
international cooperation.‖80 
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Operation Cooperation represented compromise on the part of both participating 
countries.  Mexico was able to forestall U.S. demands for aerial herbicidal defoliation by 
increasing its own efforts at manual eradication (Mexican soldiers hacking away at opium 
poppies and marijuana plants with sticks or machetes).  The U.S. backed off its demands 
(at least temporarily) regarding aerial spraying but in return was permitted to station 
American law enforcement officers inside Mexico in order to conduct surveillance of the 
poppy and marijuana fields. 81   
In the end, Operation Cooperation was not terribly effective; eradication by hand 
on the part of the Mexicans and the small contingent of American agents could not hope 
to adequately cover the entire country.  The combination of Operation Intercept and 
Operation Cooperation had the effect of eliminating less capable smugglers, removing 
competition and consolidating power in the hands of bigger, better financed criminal 
organizations.82  On the positive side of the ledger, Operation Cooperation did lay the 
foundation for future bilateral efforts between Mexico and the United States.  In spite of 
the lack of concrete results, after Operation Cooperation, President Nixon took the 
commitment of his Mexican counterparts as an article of faith.83 
After Operation Cooperation, President Nixon did not lose focus on his cause.  
His legislative agenda concerning counternarcotics included backing the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which consolidated previous federal 
statutes and increased the authority of federal narcotics agents.84  The Controlled 
Substances Act (Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970) provided the legal basis for pressing the war on drugs.85 
Leading up to the 1972 presidential election, Nixon shifted his target to heroin.  
Heroin was a more ―popular‖ target; whereas focusing on marijuana could be perceived 
as targeting the youth movement and especially young blacks, ―parents of all races and 
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political persuasions shared a common anxiety, that their children would ‗graduate‘ to 
heroin.‖86 Playing off this anxiety, Nixon rebranded his fight as ―a ‗total war‘ against 
heroin and a ‗crusade to save our children.‘‖87  Somewhat ironically, the success of the 
anti-heroin efforts targeted at Turkish opium processed in Marseilles and shipped to New 
York (the infamous ―French Connection‖) exacerbated the overall problem when the 
Mexican growers increased their efforts to fill the undiminished market demand in the 
U.S.88  
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a ―superagency‖ born of a 
combination of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (itself a conglomerate of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control), the Office of 
Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, and the 
Customs Service Drug Investigation Unit, came into being by executive order in 1973.  
Nixon‘s DEA, though its institutional power would ebb and flow over the years, would 
play a critical role in the U.S.-Mexican relationship vis-à-vis the drug trade.89 
3. Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter 
Subsequent U.S. administrations during the 1970s had a reduced focus on counter 
drug activities.  The administration of President Gerald R. Ford (1974–1977), frankly, 
had bigger fish to fry.  In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal that unseated Nixon and 
the withdrawal of American troops from the battlefields of Vietnam, President Ford and 
his team relaxed the tone of the language as compared to the Nixon administration.  
Although supporting the basic strategic approach of supply reduction and demand 
mitigation, Ford took an arguably more pragmatic approach, acknowledging that ―we 
should stop raising unrealistic expectations of total elimination of drug abuse from our 
society.‖90 
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President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) not only wished to reduce harsh penalties 
for drug offenders but substantially defunded DEA budgets as well.  While he did not 
personally approve of drug use, his laissez faire attitude toward those who did partake 
was decidedly different from that of the Nixon administration before (and the Reagan 
administration after, for that matter).91  ―The (Carter) White House projected no sense of 
urgency, and there was little coordination at the top levels of government… . Carter‘s 
ambassadors and senior foreign-policy makers, by and large, ignored the drug issue.‖92  
In retrospect, drug scandals involving aides, advisors and even allegations against 
Carter‘s own chief of staff Hamilton Jordan (ultimately unsubstantiated) probably 
damaged the Carter administration‘s efforts to decriminalize marijuana and back away 
from the drug war.93  
4. La Campaña 
Although its strategic choices have more or less aligned with U.S. 
counternarcotics strategies, Mexico has traditionally taken a different view of its 
domestic drug issues.  
Since the inception of La Campaña, Mexican officials have approached 
domestic drug abuse as a medical, educational, social, and law 
enforcement question. [However], as is the case with international 
trafficking, the major role in Mexico‘s domestic campaign is assigned to 
the Attorney General‘s Office (Procuraduria) and its enforcement arm.94   
La Campaña Pemanente is, literally, Mexico‘s Permanent Campaign against 
illegal drugs.  The Campaña effectively began after Operation Cooperation.  Peter H. 
Smith claims  
It was in 1975 that, once again under pressure from the United States, the 
Mexican government initiated its Campaña Permanente against illicit 
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drugs… (the Campaña) launched a coordinated attack that focused on 
eradication of crops, interdiction of shipments and disruption of 
commercial organizations.95  
Although the Campaña refers to Mexico‘s domestic efforts against drugs, it was 
particularly noteworthy for the level of cooperation between Mexican and U.S. agencies 
as well as the extensive utilization of the Mexican Army.96   
Mexico has attached much less political importance than the United States 
to the drug problem, even as it has given continuous and high priority to 
actual efforts to combat the production, commercialization and 
consumption of narcotics… As the drug problem all over the world has 
continued its exponential increase, Mexico has begun to pay more 
attention to the issues, channeling more resource, toward drug control.  
This, along with continuing pressure from the United States, has created a 
greater awareness of the problem in the Mexican public.97 
La Campaña has displayed various levels of effectiveness but its results during the 
latter half of the 1970s were significant.  Mexico‘s share of the U.S. marijuana and heroin 
markets plunged from more than 75 percent in 1976 to 11 percent in 1979, to 8 percent in 
1980 in the case of marijuana and from 67 percent in 1976 to 25 percent in 1980 in the 
case of heroin.98  Such remarkable numbers can be attributed in part to particular choices 
by the Mexican administrations of the period. 
5. Luis Echeverría 
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was followed into office in December 1970 by 
Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976).  President Echeverría was an unlikely ally in the 
drug war.  His policies were generally left of center and his relationship with the U.S. 
was not particularly friendly.  He inherited Operation Cooperation from his predecessors 
and although his government took no overt actions against it, neither did it do much to 
facilitate the success of the operation.  That being the case, it was probably somewhat of 
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a surprise when late in his sexenio, the Echeverría administration gave the green light to 
an aerial herbicidal spraying program to be targeted at marijuana and especially at opium 
poppy plants.99  The American law enforcement community tried to convince their 
Mexican counterparts that eradication at the source was the key to an effective 
counternarcotics program.  ―Until such time that herbicides were applied on a massive 
scale against marijuana and opium poppies, they argued, the annual Mexican campaign 
would prove an exercise in futility.‖100 
The aerial defoliation approval quickly grew into a full scale eradication 
campaign called Operation Condor.   
The Mexican government had decided to remove the kid gloves with drug 
traffickers by: (1) making the campaign truly permanent; i.e., year-round, 
(2) pouring $35 million into the effort, (3) coordinating the program 
vertically between national and subnational authorities and horizontally 
between the Justice Department (Procuraduria) and the Army, (4) 
cooperating more effectively with the United States and  other foreign 
governments, (5) vigorously addressing the problem of drug-related 
corruption, and (6) using modern technology, which featured the aerial 
application of herbicide.101 
The scale of the Mexican effort was enormous; 10,000 Mexican soldiers manually 
destroyed illegal drugs by using machetes or spraying paraquat on marijuana, aircraft 
sprayed the herbicide 2,4-D (a commonly used defoliant) on vast fields of poppies.   
The American‘s side of the project was called ―Operation Trizo,‖ short for ―tri-
zone‖ referring to the Sinaloa-Durango-Chihuahua ―Golden Triangle.‖102  The operation 
was a universally lauded as a success; both sides achieved precisely what they needed.  
The Mexicans got positive publicity; President Echeverría, whom some believed sought 
the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations after his sexenio, could avoid being seen 
as coming from the world‘s leading heroin producer.  The Americans, on the other hand 
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got a ―model program‖ that they could hold up to the world press.  Even more 
importantly, the U.S. DEA got unfettered access to fly airborne reconnaissance.103 
6. José López Portillo 
Echeverría was followed into office by President José López Portillo (1976–
1982).  It seems that, initially at least, López Portillo was prepared to continue Operation 
Condor full speed ahead.  In fact, in January 1977, the operation placed a bulls-eye target 
over the center of Mexico‘s opium industry.104  By the end of 1977, Operation Condor 
had destroyed enough poppy to yield eight tons of heroin; heroin on the street in the U.S. 
was at its lowest purity level in the 1970s.  President Carter‘s director of the White House 
Office of Drug Abuse Policy, Peter Bourne testified before a Senate subcommittee that 
the cooperative relationship between the Mexican and U.S. government was among the 
best and most effective in the world.105  
Unfortunately, that relationship was neither perfect nor permanent.  Motivated by 
bilateral dispute over natural-gas in September 1977, President López Portillo severely 
curtailed the presence inside Mexico of American law enforcement officers; thereafter, 
Mexico, alone, would be responsible for the eradication program.  American pilots would 
no longer have complete freedom of the skies and by January 1978, U.S. verification 
flights ended completely.106  In an otherwise unrelated attempt to secure a deal for 
Mexican natural-gas, the Carter administration elected not to press the issue and by 
March 1978, DEA presence left Mexico.  Although still publicly praising the Mexican 
efforts, many in the agency were disheartened.  Field Agent Travis Kuykendall summed 
up the feelings of many, ―on the eighth of March 1978, that‘s when the eradication 
program turned around and started downhill.‖107  Although la Campaña Permanente 
continued, bilateral relations related to the drug war were not at their all-time high. 
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7. Concluding the „70s 
Mexico was led to a supply oriented strategy by pressure from the United States, 
especially during the Nixon administration.  Although they still largely followed the 
paradigm throughout the decade, as the U.S. administrations reduced pressure and 
showed less interest, Mexico was less inclined to prosecute the strategy aggressively. 
C. 1980S (MILITARIZATION AND THE CAMARENA CASE: 1980–1990) 
1. Introduction 
The 1980s were marked, notoriously by the kidnapping and murder of a U.S. 
DEA agent.  Investigation pointed to levels of complicity high in the Mexican 
government and U.S. pressure ratcheted up accordingly.  After the murder of Agent 
Camarena, the U.S. sought to militarize the drug war on both sides of the border and 
sought to have Mexico recast the threat as a matter of national security. This section 
illustrates the critical junction that forced the drug war into a more militarized paradigm. 
2. 1970s Redux 
The latter half of the López Portillo sexenio saw relatively little change in terms 
of the prosecution of the drug war.  The Mexican part of Operation Condor/Trizo 
continued without positive verification by American participants.  At the dawn of the new 
decade, Mexico claimed to have stamped out the marijuana and heroin trade.  Despite 
such hyperbolic rhetoric, drug activity which had legitimately been curtailed in the 1970s 
was beginning to recover; favorable weather provided ideal growing conditions.  
Furthermore, it did not help the cause that instead of spraying their defoliant on fields of 
marijuana and poppy, Mexican pilots were being paid to empty their tanks of herbicide 
over empty desert.  Drug Enforcement Administration agents on the ground ―believed 
that corrupt officials in the Attorney General‘s Office were sabotaging the aerial spraying 
program, pocketing the State Department‘s money, and taking payoffs from the 
traffickers.‖108    
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Although American officials knew such claims of complete success to be bogus, 
the U.S. State Department and Drug Enforcement Agencies were either not interested in, 
or incapable of correcting them.  Portraying a successful program served the interests of 
State Department officials assigned to monitoring programs.  Meanwhile, DEA agents 
were being boxed out; during the final year and a half of López Portillo‘s presidency, 
DEA and their counterparts in the Mexican Federal Judicial Police ―had not been on 
speaking terms.‖109   
Although his presidency had begun basking in considerable economic optimism 
based on discovery of vast petroleum fields; by the end of his sexenio, ―it became 
obvious that [López Portillo] had mismanaged newly discovered oil reserves and was 
presiding over an orgy of corruption.‖110  In the last year of his term, López Portillo 
realized his country was foundering in economic crisis as the peso collapsed.  Having 
little choice but to submit to a bailout authored by the United States, the IMF and other 
foreign financial organs, Mexico would once again have few options other than comply 
more directly with U.S. policies and particularly anti narcotic strategies.111 
3. Miguel de la Madrid 
López Portillo was succeeded as President of Mexico by Miguel de la Madrid 
Hurtado (1982–1988).  In something of a recurrent theme, the inauguration of the new 
president promised hope, reform, and improvement.  De la Madrid claimed he would 
attack corruption head-on.  He campaigned on the promise of ―Moral Renovation‖ but 
such renovation was, unfortunately, short lived.112  De la Madrid installed new leadership 
to oversee the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (PFJ).  Manuel Ibarra Herrera was tasked 
to professionalize the force.  In the course of doing so, he appointed Miguel Aldana 
Ibarra, as head of Mexico City Interpol office.  Aldana spearheaded Operation Pacífico, 
the PFJ counter drug campaign.  Unfortunately, in the opinion of the American DEA 
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agents, Pacífico and Aldana were all flash and no bang.  The busts were all small-timers 
and the agency could not be depended upon to maintain operational security113 
In an episode foreshadowing the perils of being a professional journalist in 
Mexico, syndicated columnist Manuel Buendía, known for incendiary stories exposing 
high level corruption among government and business elites, was gunned down in May 
1984.  Federal Security Directorate (DFS) chief José Antonio Zorrilla Pérez was 
ultimately convicted along with several accomplices of Buendía‘s murder.  Zorrilla was 
also, incidentally, implicated as working for drug traffickers.  Although Zorrilla had 
previously acted as a source for Buendía and some described their relationship as 
friendship, it was believed that Buendía was about to publish allegations that connected 
Zorilla to traffickers.   
President De La Madrid condemned the killing and promised action, but 
Proceso magazine, which [had] followed the case closely, charges that a 
cover-up soon began.  An official investigation, delivered to Mexico City 
Atty. Gen. Adato fourteen months after the killing, named former police 
agent Jose Luis Ochoa Alonso as the ―material author,‖ or gunman.  
Ochoa, called El Chocorrol (Chocolate Roll) because of his dark skin, 
reportedly worked for Zorrilla until he was killed six weeks after Buendia 
while making a call at a public telephone.114 
President de la Madrid‘s sexenio was dealt a crushing blow in mid September, 
1985 when Mexico City was rocked by an 8.1 earthquake.  The administration‘s anemic 
response to the crisis undermined the very legitimacy of the entire PRI regime. ―In the 
wake of a disaster that resulted in 10,000 deaths and left tens of thousands homeless…de 
la Madrid appeared to behave more like an ‗accountant scrutinizing a balance-sheet‘ than 
a concerned patriarch of a tormented national family.‖115  Although the massive 
earthquake was devastating to the Mexican regime, an equally significant trembler rocked 
the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Mexico about six months earlier. 
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4. Kiki 
The account of the 1980s cannot be balanced without mention of Kiki Camarena.  
DEA agent Enrique ―Kiki‖ Camarena was investigating an enormous marijuana 
plantation owned by Rafael Caro Quintero known as ―Bufallo Ranch.‖116  Camarena 
―was kidnapped and murdered in Guadalajara in February 1985 and Bartlett Díaz, the 
man assumed to be picked to be the next president, was implicated by the DEA and thus 
barred for political reasons from the job.‖117  Shortly after Camarena disappeared, Caro 
Quintero escaped Guadalajara after a ―brief and presumably staged exchange of gunfire 
with police.‖118 When his body was recovered (along with the body of his pilot Alfredo 
Zavala), an autopsy confirmed that Camarena was tortured and beaten to death. ―Doctors 
[concluded] that he finally died from a tire iron slammed through his skull.‖119 The DEA 
obtained versions of three tapes of the thirty-hour torture session; Díaz, then minister of 
the interior, was physically present at the house during some part of the torture.  There 
were arrests in the case; when detained, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo had on his person a 
copy of one of the torture tapes, implicating him in the crime.  Quintero‘s April 1989 
arrest in Costa Rica was tied to the crime, as was that of Felix Gallardo that same month.  
Gallardo, while being hunted for Camarena‘s murder, stayed with the governor of 
Sinaloa.120   
Collusion between drug traffickers and the Mexican police was already 
well known to the United States, but this was the first time that Mexican 
corruption  had led to the death of a U.S. agent.  U.S. drug control 
officials… became aware that Mexican drug traffickers were being given 
cover by a vast network reaching the  highest levels of government. 
Mexico and the United States plunged headfirst into a crisis of 
confidence.121  
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For the DEA and many in the U.S., Kiki‘s murder and the fallout from it, ―finally 
illustrate how deeply entrenched the drug business is in Mexican society and how 
dangerous this mutual connection is for U.S. foreign policy.‖122 
Incensed by inaction on the part of Mexican authorities, the U.S. Customs Service 
agents effectively closed the border with a replay of Operation Intercept.123  Mexican 
officials averred that Camarena was a crooked cop and that he paid with his life for a deal 
gone bad.124  Kiki Camarena‘s murder colored the bilateral relations between Mexico and 
the United States for years to come.   
Reacting to the murder, U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) took a 
momentous step in 1986, declaring drug trafficking a threat to national security.  The 
fairly innocuous-sounding step created an opening in the United States for involvement 
of the U.S. military.  Having little option in the face of increased pressure from the north, 
de la Madrid followed Reagan‘s lead; framing the Mexican part of the drug war in a 
national security context.  Although the Mexican armed forces had long been engaged in 
the Campaña, militarization efforts in Mexico did increase their involvement in both raw 
numbers of participants and in scope of responsibility.  Mexican military officers 
increasingly found themselves appointed to leadership positions within formerly civilian-
lead law enforcement agencies, up to and including the office of the attorney general.125 
Perhaps the most significant and prickly policy fallout was the American ―Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986‖ which, among other provisions created the notorious 
―Certification Process‖ whereby the U.S. president was required to annually ―certify that 
countries were cooperating fully with U.S. policies or that they had taken adequate steps 
on their own to reduce drug proliferation.‖126  Decertified countries would be faced with 
significant economic sanctions including suspension of foreign and military aid, 
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opposition by U.S. representatives to loans and denial of preferential trade status.  
Although Mexico was never decertified, the process exposed Mexico to significant 
criticism.  In response to such harsh critique, Mexico attempted to emphasize its efforts 
against traffickers but it was a bitter pill.  Mexico ―viewed the certification ordeal as an 
imperial attack, an affront to its sovereignty.‖127 
5. Carlos Salinas 
The final Mexican President to serve during the decade was Carlos Salinas de 
Gotari (1988–1994).  Coming to power in the wake of the weak de la Madrid 
administration, Salinas‘ presidency began under a dark cloud.  The election, which has 
generally been acknowledged to have been fraudulent, was barely won by Salinas and the 
PRI.  Political columnist Juan José Hinajosa called Salinas ―the weakest president since 
[the 1930s].‖128  Despite the low starting point, the Harvard educated economist, Salinas 
was able to press an aggressive agenda of economic liberalization.129  This agenda, and 
particularly his support for what would eventually become the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), made Salinas particularly receptive to U.S. counternarcotics 
initiatives.  In order to show that his government had the political fortitude to combat 
drug trafficking, Salinas‘ administration ratcheted up the pressure on drug crime.  
Mexican prisons filled with low-level traffickers, including some arrested under 
questionable circumstances.  Even so, ―U.S. officials praised this aggressive effort and 
years later—even after the Salinas administration had been disgraced as one of Mexico‘s 
most corrupt—held up these arrest statistics as an enviable achievement.‖130 
6. Ronald Reagan 
Elected in 1980 and inaugurated in 1981, Ronald Reagan became president when 
the U.S. was more than ready for increased emphasis on anti-drug activity.  After years of 
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relative disinterest from the Carter administration, Reagan‘s administration shaped its 
anti-drug policy under the influence of ―a sizable and vocal national constituency that had 
grown impatient with the permissive attitudes toward drug use and other counterculture 
activities of the previous decade.‖131 
Taking a contrary viewpoint, Elaine Shannon argues in her book that Reagan was 
disinterested in the fighting drug traffickers at the beginning of his presidency; allowing 
First Lady Nancy Reagan and his Vice-President George H.W. Bush to be the public face 
of the drug war while his interests lay elsewhere.  Shannon asserts that Reagan did not 
really engage until after the Camarena incident.132   
Reagan was certainly focused on what he perceived as an existential threat to the 
U.S. in the form of global communism but to call him disinterested in combating drugs is 
not fair.  By 1982, he had signed executive orders placing the U.S. intelligence 
community (including the Central Intelligence Agency) at the disposal of civilian drug 
enforcement agencies.  Further, the administration proposed changes to the 1878 Posse 
Comitatus Act thereby allowing military involvement in civilian law enforcement.133  
January of that year, Reagan placed Vice President Bush at the head of the South Florida 
Task Force charged with stemming the flow of cocaine into the U.S.  The task force 
became the template for law enforcement activities; over the next three years, more than 
a dozen similar organizations brought together assistant U.S. attorneys, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), U.S. 
Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the U.S. Marshals 
Service to wield their unique skill sets against drug trafficking on the domestic front.134  
Overall, Reagan increased drug enforcement‘s budget during his terms from $855 million 
in 1981 to $4.7 billion by 1988.135   
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Compared to his predecessor, Reagan certainly turned up the heat on the 
rhetorical front.  ―We‘re rejecting the helpless attitude that drug use is so rampant that 
we‘re defenseless to do anything about it. We‘re taking down the surrender flag that has 
flown over so many drug efforts; we‘re running up a battle flag. We can fight the drug 
problem, and we can win.‖136  In his 1983 State of the Union address, Reagan reaffirmed 
that he was committed to ―an all-out war on… drug racketeers.‖137  
Internationally, Reagan‘s efforts were aimed squarely at reducing the flow of 
illegal drugs into the country, but more and more, U.S. actions tended toward a unilateral 
fight, mostly unconcerned with building cooperative strategy.138 
Shannon was right in one aspect of her argument.  The Reagan administration did 
change as a result of the kidnapping and murder of Agent Camarena.  As previously 
mentioned, defining trafficking as a national security issue and creating the certification 
process both came in the aftermath of the murder.  The United States anti drug strategy 
after the incident was built on three pillars.  ―First in a search for a trustworthy police 
partner, the United States supported efforts to purge, disband, and restructure corrupt 
police forces.  Second, U.S. officials sought a larger role for the Mexican military.  
Finally, Congress imposed the requirement‖ [for annual certification].139  These policies 
caused a fair amount of friction with Mexico but the Mexican administration did 
generally try to comply. After an August 1986 meeting between Reagan and de la 
Madrid, a White House staffer affirmed that Reagan was pleased with the Mexican 
government‘s commitment to combat production and trafficking in support of the 
strategy espoused by the U.S.140 
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7. George H. W. Bush 
Reagan‘s vice president succeeded him in 1989.  As the forty-first president, 
George H.W. Bush (1989–1993) further increased the emphasis placed on the drug war.  
Bush came out swinging; just seven months after taking office, Bush addressed the 
nation. In his first televised address Bush said ―All of us agree that the gravest domestic 
threat facing our nation today is drugs… Who‘s responsible?—Let me tell you straight 
out. Everyone who uses drugs. Everyone who sells drugs. And everyone who looks the 
other way.‖141  Bush spelled out an agenda of unflinching enforcement aimed at 
producers, sellers, and users, who would be ―caught, prosecuted, punished.‖  The Bush 
strategy would encompass four major elements: first, increased efforts at law 
enforcement aimed at making American neighborhoods safe; second, to look beyond U.S. 
borders at producing and processing countries; third, increased spending on drug 
treatment; finally, increased funding for school and community education programs 
aimed at stopping drug use before it started.  All told, Bush proposed a $1.5 billion 
increase in domestic spending and another $3.5 billion aimed at foreign interdiction and 
eradication.142  
Bush further militarized the drug war to an unprecedented level.  The 1989 
National Defense Authorization Act made the Department of Defense the lead federal 
agency responsible for detecting the entry of drugs into the U.S., made DoD accountable 
for integration of command, control, and communications in order to interdict trafficking, 
and told it to approve and fund use of National Guard troops in state-level interdiction 
efforts.143 
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The Bush international agenda was largely focused on South America through the 
implementation of the ―Andean Initiative‖144 but Mexico was far from off the scope.  
Pressure from the U.S. administration combined with desire to advance his own 
economic agenda gave Carlos Salinas no real option but to join Bush‘s war on drugs. 
Salinas approved the Northern Border Response Force, a joint project between the U.S. 
DEA and the Mexican attorney general‘s office utilizing radar and U.S. helicopter 
support to monitor the border.  He further allowed the U.S. military to station an 
intelligence unit at the U.S. embassy in Mexico intended to support drug traffic 
investigation.  His most controversial step was to permit U.S. Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) planes to overfly Mexican airspace to monitor drug 
trafficking activity. (This last step was short-lived; as information became public, 
objection became so strenuous that the program had to be terminated).145   
8. Concluding the „80s 
Through the end of 1980s, U.S. strategy had been largely consistent since the 
beginning of the prohibitionist era.  Even including the years of the Ford and Carter 
administrations when the emphasis was reduced and the rhetoric relaxed, the U.S. still 
pursued an overall strategy of reduction at the source.  In spite of the ever increasing bill 
and the limited long-term prospects for success, no U.S. administration has had the option 
to be weak in the arena of anti drug strategies.146 
The story for Mexico has been a different one.  Through the late 1980s, Mexico 
did not have a significant problem with consumption of marijuana, heroin, or cocaine.  
The real concerns for Mexico were political.  Confronting traffickers before they could 
threaten the legitimacy of the PRI government and preventing U.S. policy from 
overriding Mexican sovereignty were the two chief concerns.  Mexico‘s interests were 
best served when they could simultaneously manage these two sometimes contradictory 
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imperatives.147 As often as not, their choices were designed to limit the reach of the U.S.; 
in a twist on the lesson from the Melian Dialog, Mexico does what it must so that it can 
do what it wants. 
D. 1990S (OPENING THE BOOK ON NAFTA, CLOSING THE BOOK ON 
THE PRI: 1990–2000) 
1. Introduction 
Both Mexico and the United States adhered to the supply oriented strategy 
throughout the 1990s.  The U.S. was still politically wedded to the strategy, as anything 
less than attacking drugs appears weak on crime.  Mexico followed the U.S. lead for 
largely the same economic reasons as in previous decades but a looming political sea 
change would soon alter Mexico‘s motivations.  
The story of the decade of the 1990s begins in much the same way as the story of 
the 1980s ends.  Both Mexico and U.S. presidents remained in office as the new decade 
began; policies and preferences relating to counternarcotics strategy carried over from the 
end of last decade.  There were, however, changes in context.  In this section I will show 
that war became increasingly militarized and that Mexico‘s cooperation increased.  This 
illustrates that Mexico‘s options narrowed as the problem began to widen. 
2. Bush and the “New World Order” 
North of the border, President Bush steered the U.S. ship of state into uncharted 
waters.  To borrow a phrase from the American President, the 1990s ushered in a ―New 
World Order.‖  By 1991, the Soviet Union had dissolved and the U.S. became the 
world‘s only superpower.  Unencumbered by the responsibility of militarily countering 
the Soviets, the U.S. was able to refocus those efforts and reinvest the ―peace dividend.‖  
Bush continued to press the war on drugs with the same aggressive style as his 
predecessor and increasingly employed the armed forces as evidenced by the increase in 
the U.S. military‘s drug enforcement budget, which grew from $357 million in 1989 to 
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over $1 billion by 1992.148  His Andean initiative focused much (if not most) of the 
United States‘ counternarcotics efforts in South America on forestalling the cocaine trade 
at the source.  Military and police assistance for Colombia, alone, was approximately 
$100 million in 1990, (the rest of the decade saw numbers fluctuate from around $50 
million to over $300 million, peaking at $765 million in 2000).149 Ironically, the 
localized success of those South American oriented strategies had unforeseen 
consequences.  As the U.S. military began detection and monitoring operations in the 
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, the Colombians began seeking alternative paths for their 
product to get to market.  More aggressive enforcement efforts led to the eventual 
breakup and marginalization of the Colombian cartels (Medellin and Cali, in particular) 
opening the door for the growing Mexican cartels to evolve from middleman transporters 
into purchasers and wholesalers.150 
U.S. relations with Mexico at the beginning of the decade were still very much 
colored by the Camarena case.  Although President Bush may not have explicitly ordered 
Operation Leyenda, it is inconceivable to think he was not at least aware of it.  The 
operation, designed to bring Camarena‘s killers to justice, saw the DEA sponsor the 
abduction of Dr. Humberto Álvarez Machain from Guadalajara in 1990.  Álvarez 
Machain, who was suspected of being involved in Camarena‘s torture and murder, was 
taken by bounty hunters back to face trial in the United States.151 (An earlier, similar 
incident in 1986 involved the capture and incarceration of alleged drug dealer René 
Martín Verdugo-Urquídez).  Neither of the two men was convicted in American Courts 
but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled just before the Álvarez Machain abduction that ―illegal 
searches and seizures in other countries—with or without the participation of U.S. 
government agents - did not necessarily lead to the loss of jurisdiction for U.S. courts.  
Foreign nationals were simply not entitled to the constitutional rights enjoyed by U.S. 
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citizens.‖152  Later, in United States v. Alvarez Machain (1992), the Supreme Court ruled 
that an existing extradition treaty (like the one between the U.S. and Mexico) does not 
preclude the U.S. from forcibly abducting a citizen of another country and bringing him 
to trial in Federal Court.153  Not surprisingly the Mexican government objected, calling 
the action kidnapping but ultimately did not press the issue for reasons to be discussed 
later in this chapter.154  
President Bush‘s personal involvement vis-à-vis Mexico was illustrated in the 
course of the Certification Process.  Despite some controversy and pushback from 
members of Congress, Bush never decertified Mexico.  Statements issued in conjunction 
with the certifications, while not a complete whitewash, tended not to dwell on Mexico‘s 
shortcomings; instead highlighting those areas where Mexico‘s efforts coincided with 
U.S. objectives.  The 1990 report praised President Salinas‘ for increased support of anti-
narcotics programs, arrests of key figures in the Camarena case, and the signing of a 
bilateral agreement as well as other ―good news‖ stories.  In fairness, it did acknowledge 
indications of continuing corruption in police and military organizations.155  The 1991 
certification was even ―kinder and gentler‖ although not completely without reservation.  
In it, Bush praised Salinas not only for an improved record of ―seizures, arrests and 
eradication, but in the broader sense of an overall systemic improvement in narcotics 
control… but there is still much to do.‖156  Bush‘s final certification in 1992 mentioned 
concerns about an incident from November 1991 wherein Mexican soldiers killed seven 
Mexican drug enforcement agents but on the whole was effusive in its support.  ―While 
corruption continues to impede efforts to curb drug trafficking in Mexico, sustained 
interdiction, intensified eradication, broad demand reduction/eradication efforts, systemic 
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legal reforms and tough anti-corruption measures clearly demonstrate Mexico‘s political 
will to combat drug trafficking on all fronts.‖157  It could be argued that such statements 
were overly generous, but the message seems pretty clear: comply with U.S. strategic 
goals and maintain status as ―certified.‖  Jorge Chabat contends that ―despite the potential 
annual anti-drug certification, it was useful during the time that it was in place to improve 
diplomatic relations with Mexico by providing arguments to support the goodwill of the 
country in the fight against drug trafficking. This was possible because the criteria used 
for certification were based more on the efforts by countries producing or transiting 
drugs, than on the results.‖158 
3. Salinas and NAFTA 
Carlos Salinas completed two-thirds of his sexenio at the opening of the new 
decade.  Despite the fact that he very nearly lost his election in 1988 (most would say he 
did lose), he ended up as a very popular president.  The U.S. government seems to have 
been pleased with Salinas‘ installation as president; educated in America, supportive of 
economic liberalization and an active participant in the drug fight, Salinas‘ presidency 
was enthusiastically supported by U.S. administrations. 
After the controversial election, Salinas sought to recapture support of the 
Mexican public through his National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), which 
marginalized the PRI elites by bypassing them in the process of providing patronage 
directly to the people.  To an even greater extent, PRONASOL competed directly with 
political opponents from the newly formed opposition party, the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD).  The success of PRONASOL was such that Salinas ―toyed with the 
idea that the 100,000 Solidarity committees could provide a base for returning to Los 
Pinos in 2000 if [presumed successor Luis Donaldo] Colosio could eliminate the 
constitutional ban on reelection.‖159  Further, Salinas reestablished formal diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican after more than a century; a savvy move in a largely Catholic 
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country, especially considering that the opposition National Action Party (PAN) was 
more traditionally associated with the Church; the move certainly appealed to any 
Catholic voters that might have been ―on the fence.‖  He also sought to curry favor with 
his own military establishment in an effort to strengthen his political position.160   
This posturing was done in order to help facilitate Salinas‘ most ambitious pet 
project.  Carlos Salinas was an enthusiastic champion of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  NAFTA became ―the world‘s largest free trade area, which now links 444 
million people producing $17 trillion worth of goods and services.‖161  Despite its 
subsequent passage and relative success, NAFTA was by no means a sure bet in the early 
nineties.  Salinas recognized that ill-will and fallout from violence of the drug war could 
derail his efforts.  In hopes of placating NAFTA critics, Salinas agreed to allow armed 
DEA agents into Mexico and allow satellite surveillance to detect drug operations.  He 
also created the Center for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO) as an intelligence center, 
the National Drug Control Program (PNCD), and the National Institute to Combat Drugs 
(INCD).162   
Salinas further strengthened his relationship with both the U.S. and his own 
military by incorporating the Mexican military more completely in the anti-drug 
campaign.  Inclusion in the National Development Program, which was the key policy 
document relating to security issues, singled out drug trafficking as an affront to national 
security and accordingly legitimized the use of the military in the fight.163 
The decisions made by Salinas were largely shaped by his desires to press 
forward with the NAFTA initiatives.  Salinas pushed changes in the fight against 
traffickers because of perceived pressure from the U.S. Congress.  U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency analysis supports this connection between Salinas‘ concern for 
                                                 
160 Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence, 46–47. 
161 Office of the United States Trade Representative. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). July 27 2009. 
162 Grayson, „Drugs and Thugs,‟ 30. 
163 Sigrid Arzt, ―the Militarization of the Procuraduría General de la Repúbllica: Risks for Mexican 
Democracy.‖ In Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius and David A. 
Shirk. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 157. 
 44 
NAFTA and his efforts against the cartels.  Internal memoranda indicate that he was 
cooperating on drug issues and that this ―reflects in part President Salinas‘ hope that 
paying more attention to drug issues will minimize frictions with the United States that 
could jeopardize Mexico‘s economic recovery, his top domestic priority.‖164  The memo 
clearly connected Mexico‘s counternarcotics policies with the approval of NAFTA. 
(Protection for NAFTA may have been in the interests of both sides, Chabat cites 
American reporting that claimed both Bush and Clinton sought to insulate NAFTA 
negotiations by exaggerating Mexican accomplishments versus drug traffickers).165 
Far from an unqualified success, Salinas‘ tenure as president was marked by 
increasing violence on the part of the cartels and political murders that touched his own 
administration.  The postscript on this anti drug crusader:  His older brother Raul was in 
prison for money laundering and murder.166  The INCD (modeled after the U.S. DEA) 
was to be disbanded in the wake of revelation that director General Jesús Gutiérrez 
Rebollo was on the payroll of the Juárez cartel.167 Salinas‘ anticipated successor, Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated (with some conspiracy theorists pointing a finger a 
Salinas himself168) and his eventual replacement, political novice Ernesto Zedillo, would 
be the final president of the PRI‘s seventy plus years of uninterrupted monopoly of 
power.169  
4. Bill Clinton 
The American administration of Bill Clinton (1993–2001) was something of a 
study in bureaucratic inertia.  Similar to the experience of the Ford and Carter 
administrations during the 1970s, Clinton tried to chart a more moderate course, avoiding 
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the bellicose rhetoric and moving away from the militarized drug war of the Reagan and 
Bush years.  This goal would prove to be considerably easier to state than to achieve and 
for Clinton political appointees, even saying it would prove to be difficult and politically 
costly.170 
Bill Clinton, the consummate politician, recognized very quickly that changing 
the anti-drug paradigm would be difficult and, lacking any kind of popular mandate, 
would require considerable personal intervention on the part of the president.  Clinton‘s 
unwillingness to press the issue kept his efforts guarded, minimal and tentative; faced 
with opposition from a still-mobilized network of pro-law and order conservatives, he 
was more inclined to retreat from conflict over the issue of drug policy.171 
Early efforts to tone down the language of war tried to shift U.S. strategy toward 
treating drug use as a health problem (rather than a law-enforcement issue). Clinton‘s 
drug czar, Lee Brown, a former New York City Police Commissioner, attempted to 
retreat from the ―war metaphor‖ in public speeches.  His Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) released 1994 National Drug Control Strategy intended to redirect U.S. 
strategy against ―chronic, hardcore drug use and the violence that surrounds it.‖172  
Attorney General Janet Reno argued that drug abuse was symptomatic of deeper societal 
problems and that mandatory sentencing guidelines for non-violent drug offenders was 
excessively burdening the U.S. prison system (and by extension, the U.S. government 
that had to foot the bill).  Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders implied in public statements 
that drug crime might be caused by enforcement strategies and that legalization should be 
considered as a means to diminish such social damage.  Not surprisingly, such statements 
drew criticism from conservative opponents.  Elders‘ remarks played a role in her firing, 
meanwhile Clinton, not wanting to appear soft on crime, avoided the political battle; he 
and his appointees toned down the reformist rhetoric.173  
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Clinton also attempted (unsuccessfully) to reduce the size of the federal 
government‘s anti-drug bureaucracy.  In an attempt to keep campaign promises to reduce 
the size of the government, he proposed to reduce the size of Lee‘s ONDCP by more than 
80 percent.  Clinton‘s proposed contraction from a staff of 146 to just 25 members met 
significant congressional opposition from both political parties.  Ultimately Congress 
allowed a reduction to 40 staffers and doubled Clinton‘s proposed budget for ONDCP.174 
Clinton‘s attempt to change the autonomous DEA into a division of the FBI was 
met with similar resistance.  The DEA, objecting to the reorganization claimed that such 
a move ―would greatly disrupt our nation‘s drug effort... [and] would also trigger the 
perception of a serious reduction in the federal government‘s commitment to this crime 
problem.‖175  Perhaps his most surprising opponents were the Democrats in the House of 
Representatives.  New York Representative Charles Schumer and New Jersey‘s William 
Hughes (both Democrats) lambasted the proposal and essentially told the president that 
such a move could not proceed without congressional approval.  Again, the 
administration retreated; the Attorney General promised instead to improve interagency 
coordination through ―more modest means.‖176 
Clinton attempted to sponsor other attempts to reduce the scope of the war on 
drugs.  An attempt to reduce spending on interdiction efforts by a mere seven percent met 
stiff congressional opposition.  In the face of another assured congressional fight, Clinton 
opted not to pursue those cuts and, in fact created a new position for an interdiction 
coordinator, designed as much as anything to convince conservative opponents in 
Congress of the administration‘s sincerity and commitment to the interdiction mission.177 
The crux of the issue for the Clinton administration and their attempts at shifting 
policy were captured in the aforementioned 1994 National Drug Control Strategy 
document.  The document highlighted four ―focal points‖ as the U.S. strategy goals: One, 
(previously mentioned) [reducing] chronic hardcore drug use and the violence that 
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surrounds it, which are at the heart of the nation‘s current drug crisis.  Two, concentrate 
prevention efforts to educate the young on the dangers of illicit drug use.  Three, 
empower local communities with an integrated plan of education, prevention, treatment, 
and law enforcement.  Finally, four, change how the United States carries out 
international drug control policy to refocus interdiction‘s emphasis from the transit zones 
to the source countries.  The first of the four focal points was the only one that was 
radically different from previously articulated strategies.  The funding required to 
implement the change was relatively modest (only $355 million) but in an austere 
spending environment, the proposal required a clear message to the Congress that it was a 
high priority.  In the absence of any signal from the Clinton Administration, congress 
whittled the appropriation down to $57 million and removed the stipulation that the funds 
be reserved to treat hardcore users.178 
The Clinton administration made what could at best be characterized as a half-
hearted attempt to redirect U.S. strategy for dealing with drugs.  In the end, he was unable 
to affect any significant change.  Spending for treatment and prevention programs was 
roughly proportional to spending for those same programs under the previous 
administration.  Attempts to deemphasize the drug war rhetoric resulted in harsh criticism 
from drug war supporters.  Just two years into his first term, rather than reducing the 
scale of the drug war, budgets were larger than ever and the percentage spent on 
enforcement and interdiction was essentially unchanged.179  After 1995, the Democrats 
lost their majority in both houses of Congress and what little hope of reform there was 
evaporated altogether.  Clinton‘s experience in trying to change U.S. strategy illustrates 
the difficulty faced when attempting to make such changes.  Even if a president was 
willing to endure the political costs, the prospects of making significant changes to the 
drug war paradigm are extremely unlikely.180 
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5. Ernesto Zedillo 
Mexico‘s president for the last part of the 1990s was Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de 
León (1994–2000).  Zedillo, a Yale educated PhD economist, was a political rookie.  He 
was thrust suddenly into the role of presidential candidate when Salinas‘ heir apparent 
Luis Donaldo Colosio (for whom Zedillo was campaign manager) was assassinated while 
campaigning in Tijuana.  Zedillo was the final president from the PRI, ending an over 70-
year ―dynasty.‖  Zedillo‘s administration made significant and apparently sincere 
attempts to institute reforms and cooperate with the United States in operation against 
drug trafficking, but was dealt some fairly significant setbacks. 
From his earliest days in office and throughout his term, Zedillo sought to 
increase direct involvement of the Mexican military.  The 1995 Chihuahua Pilot Project, 
for example, replaced 120 Federal Judicial Police officers from the Chihuahua office of 
the attorney general with soldiers on loan from the army.  The project soon expanded to 
encompass all regional attorney general offices and the Federal Judicial Police was 
manned by military members at all levels. Additionally, military officers took on 
responsibility for CENDRO, the attorney general‘s intelligence center, and the INCD, 
Mexico‘s equivalent to the DEA.  Police forces at federal, state, and local levels were 
replaced with military personnel in nearly every Mexican state.  By 1999, the 
establishment of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) virtually eliminated any distinction 
that remained between police and military as half of its cadre was drawn from the ranks 
of military police.181 
The militarization of the Mexican counternarcotics effort was welcomed by the 
U.S.182  Following a visit by then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, Mexico 
resumed accepting U.S. aid (it had refused aid from 1993 through 1995) and established a 
bilateral group for military issues, including counternarcotics operations.  Additionally, 
U.S. forces began to train and equip Airmobile Special Forces Groups (GAFE) within the 
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Mexican army to prepare for direct action missions against drug cartels.183  Ironically, 
deserters from GAFE units formed the original core of the ―Zetas.‖  Originally enforcers 
for the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas are now a significant drug trafficking organization (DTO) in 
their own right.184 
Zedillo‘s decision to further militarize the drug war was based at least partly on 
the idea that the military was less susceptible to corruption.185  Unfortunately, the use of 
the armed forces was no panacea for corruption and one of the unintended results of their 
employ was the arrest of over 150 soldiers and officers in the last half of the decade.186  
The most notorious episode was the arrest of General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, head of 
the INCD, whom U.S. Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey had called ―a guy of absolute 
unquestioned integrity.‖187  After it was revealed that Gutiérrez Rebollo had protected 
Juarez cartel capo Amado Carillo, the general was jailed and his INCD disbanded.188 
A series of high level scandals and accusations plagued the Zedillo government.  
Governors were linked to drug traffickers in Sonora, Morelos, Puebla, Yucatán, 
Campeche, and Quintana Roo.  Although the attorney general supported the governors, 
―the general assumption is that the drug business cannot prosper without official 
protection from the top levels in those regions.‖189  
According to a leaked CIA documents, government minister Francisco Labastida 
Ochoa was accused of maintaining ties to the cartels while governor of Sinaloa.  The 
report, published in the Washington Times in 1998 was flatly denied by the Zedillo 
administration and Barry McCaffrey (whose ability to judge must be considered suspect 
after the Gutiérrez Rebollo embarrassment) claimed that there was no compelling 
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evidence.190  Interestingly enough, Francisco Labastida Ochoa went on to run for the 
presidency on the PRI ticket after Zedillo‘s sexenio. 
Mexican newspapers in 1999 accused former PRI governor Carlos Hank 
Gonzalez of involvement in drug trafficking and financial irregularities.  Based on reports 
from the National Drug Intelligence Center, he and his family had been involved in 
money laundering and drug trafficking for decades.191 
The president‘s own private secretary Liébano Sáenz was accused of being 
connected with drug trafficking organizations.  McCaffrey, Reno and U.S. ambassador 
Jeffrey Davidow all denied having knowledge of the accusations but the rumors 
persisted.192 
In an attempt to restore confidence in their partner, Mexico began a new practice 
of extraditing Mexicans accused of trafficking to face justice in U.S. courts.  This 
practice has continued through to the present, actually accelerating after Mexican courts 
ruled on the constitutionality of such extraditions.  Zedillo took other steps to placate a 
skeptical America, including increasing participation in joint training and even allowing 
armed DEA agents inside Mexican territory.193  In the interest of protecting the 
sometimes fragile bilateral relations, both Mexico and the U.S. defended most of those 
government officials accused of complicity during the Zedillo and Clinton 
administrations.  However as Astorga points out, ―from the beginning to the end of the 
twentieth century… what remains is the profound impression of an integration and 
articulation of interests between the political sector and drug trafficking.‖194 
Despite the inclination to defend members of the Zedillo government and a 
generally optimistic public face on the bilateral relations, there must have been an 
underlying distrust of the Mexican government.  Despite cooperative agreements and 
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joint military training, the U.S. was willing to act unilaterally.  Operation Casablanca was 
an undercover operation conducted by U.S. Customs agents that led to the arrest of 
twenty-two high- and mid-level Mexican banking officials from some of Mexico‘s 
largest banks on charges of laundering drug money.  U.S. officers seized $35 million, two 
tons of cocaine and four tons of marijuana.  President Zedillo was not even informed of 
the operation in advance.195 
6. Concluding the „90s 
Finally, in 2000, the PRI was defeated at the ballot box.  Losing its hegemonic 
grip on political power, the victory of PAN candidate Vicente Fox signaled a new 
democratic spirit but was likely the beginning of the explosive growth of power and 
violence for the Cartels. 
From the late eighties, when the PAN won its first governorship, the power 
dynamic among DTOs began to change.196  Newly elected PAN governors apparently did 
not grasp the relationship between the DTOs and former PRI officials.197  It is thus, not 
surprising that those states governed by non-PRI governors were the first to experience 
increased levels of violence.198  
Through the Mexican Ministry of the Interior and the federal police, as 
well as governorships and other political offices, the government 
established patron-client relationships with drug traffickers (just as it did 
with other sectors of the economy and society). This arrangement limited 
violence against public officials, top traffickers, and civilians; made sure 
that court investigations never reached the upper ranks of cartels; and 
defined the rules of the game for traffickers… As the PRI‘s political 
monopoly ended, so, too, did its control over the drug trade. Electoral 
competition nullified the unwritten understandings, requiring drug lords to 
negotiate with the new political establishment and encouraging rival 
traffickers to bid for new market opportunities. Accordingly, Mexico‘s 
drug-related violence rose first in opposition-led states.199 
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The dissolution of hegemonic power, beginning at the dawn of the decade and 
continuing until the final defeat of the PRI in 2000 is the single most important factor 
affecting Mexico‘s strategic choice in the drug war since the Nixon declaration in 1969.  
Prior to the ouster of the PRI, Mexico seems to have tied its strategies to placating the 
U.S. (or not) based on economic motivations.  After the PRI, Mexico seems to be moving 
toward battling a more existential threat. 
E. 2000S (WAR ON TERROR, WAR ON DRUGS: 2000–2011) 
1. Introduction 
The dawn of the new millennium arrived with much promise and hope.  Mexico‘s 
political process at least appeared to be both democratizing and opening.  George W. 
Bush, the newly elected President of the United States was a Spanish-speaking former 
governor of Texas who seemed to get along well with Vicente Fox, Mexico‘s new pro-
business president on a personal level.200   
Unfortunately, events on the world stage soon overshadowed any progress in the 
bilateral relationship; for the U.S., the next decade would be devoted to fighting wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Meanwhile, the war on drugs, while far from forgotten, took a 
back seat to the war on terror.   
Despite the changed emphasis from drug war to terror war, real change in U.S. 
counternarcotics strategy over the last ten years has been minimal.  Primary focus on 
attacking drugs at the source and interdicting traffickers as early as possible in the supply 
chain is, at the macro level, no different than it was in 1969 when President Nixon began 
the war.  Differences between target countries (Colombia instead of Mexico, for 
example) are merely tactical distinctions, not strategic ones for the U.S. 
Mexico, for its part, also continued to pursue a supply-oriented strategy towards 
counternarcotics, but the motivation for that pursuit shifted across presidential 
administrations from purely economic to a more urgent and existential one.   During the 
Fox administration, economic considerations were still key to understanding bilateral 
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cooperation but the increase of cartel influence beginning late in his sexenio and 
continuing into the Calderón administration has threatened the state and impinged on the 
government of Mexico‘s legitimacy in the entirety of its territory. 
Mexico‘s choices seem to confirm that the departure of the PRI from their 
position as the sole arbiter of Mexican politics led to less governmental control of DTOs.  
The increasingly violent actions of the cartels have caused some to claim that Mexico has 
verged on becoming a failed state.201  This claim is perhaps a bit of hyperbole, Mexico 
ranks 98 of 177 states indexed by Foreign Policy magazine in 2010.202  Certainly, 
President Calderón takes exception to the characterization,203 but the challenge to 
Mexico‘s state authority (even if only in selected states) could not be ignored. 
In this chapter I argue that intensification of the conflict, especially the increased 
violence, explains Mexico‘s eagerness to confront the cartels, but, that direct use of 
military forces and efforts to reform a corrupt judiciary and police institutions, while new 
to Mexico, are essentially aimed at improving eradication, interdiction, and enforcement.  
2. Evolution of the Cartels and Related Violence 
The Mexican cartels, in their more or less modern form were born around the time 
the first PRI governors lost their positions in the late eighties. Miguel Angel Felix 
Gallardo [was] a well known Mexican drug smuggler who had consolidated many of the 
small time smugglers in the 1970s into a single organization and by then controlled much 
of the illegal drug trade along the border.‖204  Gallardo was eventually arrested in 1989 
but continued to direct his organization from behind bars.  His lieutenants however, 
struggled amongst themselves for power within the organization.   Gallardo convened a 
meeting during which he identified the U.S. government as their principal opponent.  In 
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order to eliminate infighting, he divided up responsibilities by territory with each 
lieutenant responsible for a particular plaza.  From this meeting, four of the major cartels 
in place in Mexico today emerged: Tijuana, Sinaloa-Sonora, Juarez and the Gulf 
Cartel.205  ―The modus vivendi, designed by Felix Gallardo, depended on the various 
factions respect for the territories of the other crime syndicates.‖206 
The breakdown began in the mid nineties when Joaquin ―El Chapo‖ Guzmán 
Loera separated from Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) in Tijuana. He was largely 
successful at controlling Baja California and sortied into Sinaloa and the Durango plazas 
as well. ―El Chapo‖ and his rapidly expanding empire was a vanguard in bringing 
intramural violence into the cartel structure.207 
By 2005, the last year of the Vicente Fox sexenio, violence between cartels was 
on the rise.  The Sinaloans moved against the Gulf Cartel, lead by Osiel Cárdenas 
Guillén.  Cárdenas Guillén fought back sending the Gulf enforcers (Los Zetas) to 
Michoacán to attack transit routes and ports where narcotics and precursor chemicals 
enter the country. The AFO in Tijuana and the Juárez cartel sided with the Gulf Cartel 
against the Sinaloans and their allies from the Milenios, Jaliscos, and Colimas.  The battle 
lines thus drawn, a mounting death toll and particularly savage behavior greeted Fox‘s 
successor.208 
President Calderón began to fight the Cartels immediately upon taking office and 
within two years had scored significant victories in the form of high profile arrests and 
seizures, especially from the his primary target, the Gulf Cartel.  Operations against the 
Gulf cartel left it reeling and its former enforcers, Los Zetas, splintered off to become a 
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Gulf cartel opened the door for other competing organizations to fight between 
themselves (and even internally amongst themselves) to fill the void left by the decline of 
the old guard.209 
By the end of 2009, the violence can be clearly separated into the fight against the 
cartels and the battles between them.  Areas of influence remain mostly unchanged with 
the exception of the Michoacan area where a new quasi-religious trafficking organization 
known as La Familia began to take root.  The next year saw tensions between Los Zetas 
and the weakened Gulf Cartel reach the flashpoint as conflict became open war along the 
coast.  The Gulf organization reached out to former rivals in Sinaloa and La Familia 
Michoacán (LFM) and the ―New Federation‖ scored some success against the Zetas. 210 
The Sinaloa Federation continues to expand its territory north and east, 
taking over areas formerly under the influence of the Carrillo Fuentes 
Organization and the Arellano Felix Organization.  With the help of 
Sinaloa, the Gulf cartel has been able to repel offenses from Los Zetas in 
Reynosa and Matamoros, though the Zetas are proving resilient.  LFM 
appeared to implode in January, but now a large subset of the former LFM 
seems to have simply rebranded itself as the ―Knights Templar.‖ Its size 
and capabilities remain unclear.211  
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Figure 1.   Drug cartel areas of influence (From STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 
2011).   
3. Vicente Fox 
The changing of the guard in Mexico occurred on December 1, 2000, when 
Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006) became the first president in seventy years to come 
from a party other than the PRI.  Fox, a conservative member of the PAN, had the heart 
of a reformer but faced opposition to reforms from both inside Mexico and north of the 
border. 
Washington enthusiastically welcomed the new president as he seemed to 
approach the counternarcotics issue with guns blazing.  Shortly after taking office, Fox 
initiated a thorough housecleaning among border inspectors; within a month contraband 
seizures were almost four times higher than the entire previous year.212  Fox seemed 
eager to attack concerns with corruption and bilateral cooperation over topics like 
extradition but the elimination of the Certification Process was at the top of his agenda. 
Fox addressed the U.S. Congress in early September 2001, imploring them to 
suspend certification as a gesture of goodwill to his new administration.  His argument 
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that ―trust requires that one partner not be judged unilaterally by the other‖213 appears to 
have resonated with U.S. lawmakers.  Congress granted a waiver to the annual 
certification in 2001 and the next year modified the requirement such that the president 
had only to de-certify those countries that had ―‗failed demonstrably,‘ during the previous 
12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to obligations under international 
counter-narcotics agreements.‖214  This political win for Mexico was one of the few clear 
cut victories for Fox.  Unfortunately, much of the rest of his sexenio was marked by 
failed attempts at real reform; most notably attempts to demilitarize the fight. 
It should be noted that the Fox administration was able to maintain a generally 
favorable bilateral relationship with the U.S., especially as related to military and law 
enforcement cooperation and training.  U.S. training and support for Mexican police 
agencies and the Mexican military increased during Fox‘s sexenio.  U.S. FBI and DEA 
trainers instructed thousands of officers every year as part of a program known as 
Resolution Six, which included course work in interview and interrogation, crime scene 
investigation, crisis management, ethics and anticorruption, as well as other advanced law 
enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The military actively sought out special 
training to increase its counterdrug operational capacity.  The use of U.S. mobile training 
teams (MTTs), which took U.S. trainers to Mexico, was a remarkable development 
considering Mexico‘s traditional distrust of the U.S. military.215  Despite increased 
cooperation on training programs there were issues that caused friction. 
Fox and his advisors initially favored a strategy that would treat trafficking as a 
―matter of public order rather than one of national security.‖216  The transition team 
further proposed gradual demilitarization of the law enforcement apparatus in Mexico but 
this did not match the expectations of the United States.  U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey 
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warned Fox ―not to move too quickly in eliminating the role of the Mexican military in 
the drug war… until you have other institutions and ways of going about it, be careful of 
what you do.‖217  The proposal by Fox‘s transition team was rolled back under pressure 
from the U.S. ―clearly showing the limits of the maneuvering room of the Mexican 
government opposite the U.S. government in areas of drug control.‖218 Fox not only 
backed off the demilitarization plan but actually increased military participation in 
federal law enforcement agencies.219 
It is believed that Fox conceded on the demilitarization issue in order to reduce 
friction over drug control so as to buy trade space on issues of trade and immigration.  In 
any case, he named Brigadier General Rafael Macedo de la Concha to be his attorney 
general and filled his Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) with military officers.  
The U.S. was delighted by the influx of military personnel in the PGR, believing it would 
positively influence reform efforts. 220 
Other initiatives aimed at changing the nature of Mexico‘s counternarcotics 
strategy met with similar resistance from north of the border.  A 2006 Fox proposal to 
decriminalize small amounts of drugs for personal use was strongly opposed by 
Washington.  Under pressure from the U.S., Mexico opted to withdraw the proposal 
before it could be voted on by the Mexican legislature.221 
Not all of the opposition to his project came from the U.S.; other branches of his 
own government threw up roadblocks as well.  Fox, having inherited the state apparatus 
from an entrenched political machine (including what was perceived as a corrupt and 
incompetent judiciary), proposed a significant slate of judicial reforms during the last 
third of his presidency.  Fox‘s reforms aimed to make structural, procedural and 
professional changes by proposing new laws, making changes to current laws and 
amending the constitution.  Some of the most profound changes included police 
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investigation of crimes (formerly the responsibility of prosecutors), presumption of 
innocence, oral arguments in trial proceedings, the possibility of plea bargaining, 
alternative dispute resolution, and more strict professional requirements for members of 
the legal profession (especially defense counsel).  These and the other accompanying 
proposals were meant to increase transparency, provide stronger protection for the 
accused, and make the organs of justice more timely and efficient.222 
Unlike his presidential predecessors, Fox did not have the advantage of a unified 
and politically allied congress; severely limiting his ability to pass legislation.  Even 
though he had met with some success in previous years, creating new law enforcement 
agencies like the Federal Investigative Police (AFI) an analog to the U.S. FBI and was 
able to press reforms to the juvenile justice system, his 2004 reform package was met by 
stiff resistance and in the end, was not passed by the legislature.223 
Critics cited long implementation requirements and were especially critical of 
what was perceived as the ―importing of foreign legal concepts into the Mexican criminal 
justice system.‖224  There was concern that those reforms capitulated to foreign 
disapproval and the support of foreign actors and non-governmental organizations fed 
established belief that the U.S. was attempting to unduly influence Mexican internal 
affairs.225 
Working within the confines of a restrictive judicial system, the Fox 
administration was prepared to use extradition as a tool to fight organized crime (OC), 
but was obstructed for much of his sexenio by Mexican law and the ruling of the National 
Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN).  The court maintained that Mexican citizens could not 
be extradited to a country wherein they could be subjected to penalties beyond that which 
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the Mexican courts could apply (sentences in excess of sixty years or capital 
punishment).  Fox was, however, able to extradite U.S. citizens or third country nationals. 
After 2005, when the SCJN reversed its position on life imprisonment (ruling that it was 
not cruel and unusual) Fox was able to employ the tactic against some high level 
Mexican cartel bosses including Francisco Rafael Arellano Félix.  Although relatively 
small in scope, Fox‘s use of extradition was ultimately a fairly rare political victory for 




Figure 2.   Extraditions from Mexico by nationality, 1995–2008 (From Artz, 2010). 
In the end, Vicente Fox probably had a better relationship with the U.S. than with 
his own government.  Actions during the first half of his term resulted in 22,000 drug 
related arrests, including a significant number of kingpins.  The hard line taken by the 
Fox administration was praised by U.S. drug czar John Walters as ―going farther [in 
antidrug efforts] than any other nation, including the United States.‖227  Meanwhile, at 
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home, Fox became a virtual prisoner of his own Congress as, for the first time ever they 
denied the president‘s request to travel to Canada and the U.S. in April 2002.  As a result, 
George Grayson describes Fox as ―a lame duck with four years left in his term.‖228   
Fox‘s policies of purging and reorganizing federal police agencies and increasing 
use of extradition were assessed by Francisco Gonzalez.  Gonzalez called them effective 
in terms of increasing arrests and interdictions but claimed that they ―fell far short of the 
government‘s objective of defeating the cartels.  Moreover, the capture of some cartel 
leaders was tantamount to kicking hornets‘ nests without having the means to spray the 
rattled insects.‖229  Not a particularly flattering portrait. 
4. George W. Bush 
Of course no discussion about President George W. Bush (2001–2009) can even 
begin without considering the War on Terror.  If any U.S. president ever experienced a 
defining moment, surely September 11, 2001, was that event for Bush.  Foreign policy, 
domestic policy, every aspect of his presidency was colored by the events of that day and 
the bilateral relationship with Mexico was no exception. 
The interrelation between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror goes in both 
directions.  Analysts cite structural and hierarchical parallels between terrorist groups and 
DTOs.  ―The tactics, strategy, organization and even (to a limited extent) the goals of the 
Mexican drug cartels are all perfectly consistent with those of recognized terrorist 
organizations [excepting the typical political or religious ideological motivation].‖230 
Others, like Tony Payan disagree that the two wars are analogous, calling the blending of 
the two ―conflating the issues,‖231 but regardless of scholarly assessment, the Bush 
administration certainly saw a nexus between drugs and terror.  The 2008 National Drug 
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Control Strategy documented five goals, the third of which was to ―focus on the nexus 
between the drug trade and other potential transnational threats to the United States, 
including terrorism.‖232 
As a result, experience gained from pursuing cartel kingpins was translated into 
the hunt for key terrorist figures; indeed the tactic has been key to both counternarcotics 
and counterterrorism operations.233  The war on terror borrowed heavily from policy 
coordination committees, interagency task forces and exchange programs, and various 
other institutions that formed the network aimed against drug trafficking; a trend that has 
accelerated for both conflicts since 9/11.234   
The Bush administration‘s prosecution of its counternarcotics policies largely 
combined the notions of the drug war, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism into a 
single agenda for U.S. policy.  After 9/11, the administration and the Congress ―blurred 
the distinction between counterdrug and counterterrorism and have criticized those who 
would maintain it as out of touch with a changed global reality.‖235 
Despite the context of the War on Terror, the decade starting in 2001 did not 
witness significant change to the supply focused U.S. strategy in the drug war.  George 
W. Bush inherited a legacy program from his predecessor in the form of Plan Colombia, 
which dominated the counternarcotics program of his entire first term and most of his 
second. 
Plan Colombia is worth examining in some detail as it is frequently compared to 
the Mérida Initiative in Mexico and is often touted as a model program.  ―Plan Colombia 
was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year plan to end 
Colombia‘s long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and 
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social development.‖236  Between 2000 and 2007, the U.S. spent over $7 billion on 
foreign and military aid in Colombia, of which almost 80 percent was dedicated to 
interdiction and strengthening Colombia‘s military and National Police, while 10 to 20 
percent was dedicated to economic and social programs intended to provide alternatives 
for poor Colombian farmers.237  Success was a mixed bag. ―While there has been 
measurable progress in Colombia‘s internal security, as indicated by decreases in 
violence, and in the eradication of drug crops, no effect has been seen with regard to 
price, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the United States.‖238 
As a model for Mexico, such a result may have been just ―good enough.‖  
Following a similar model, the Bush administration proposed the ―Mérida Initiative‖ in 
2007 in direct response to the increasing traffic and escalating violence.  The program 
aimed $1.4 billion over three years at counterdrug initiatives in the Caribbean and 
Mexico with Mexico as the principal beneficiary.239  Perhaps predictably, the plan 
emphasized traditional enforcement and interdiction assistance, but gave relatively little 
consideration to such issues as corruption and poverty.  The funding, while an overall 
increase of about $350 million the first year over traditional amounts, spent four out of 
every five dollars on equipment, tools and training for Mexican counternarcotics, border 
security and law enforcement and about one dollar in five on institutional support and 
―rule of law‖.240 
Proponents of the Mérida Initiative hailed it as a ―new kind of regional security 
partnership between the United States, Mexico and Central America‖241 but President 
Bush‘s drug war was a story of ―staying the course‖ strategically. The two most obvious 
manifestations of the counterdrug strategy are in the two multi-billion dollar programs in 
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Colombia and Mexico.  Although there are differences (no direct troop involvement in 
Mexico, about half the duration, and ultimately about one fifth the total expenditure as 
compared to Plan Colombia) the two programs are essentially different verses of the 
same song.  
The Bush administration was a true believer in the supply side paradigm. The 
previously mentioned 2008 National Drug Control Strategy‘s five goals bear this out: 
This document assigns the greatest importance to disrupting the operations 
of major foreign cartels rather than restricting domestic demand, 
promoting social and economic development in source countries, or 
pursuing alternative strategies for combating the drug trade.  The five 
goals of the strategy are: ―(1) reduce the flow of  drugs into the United 
States; (2) disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; (3)  
focus on the nexus between the drug trade and other potential  
transnational threats to the United States, including terrorism; (4) deny 
drug traffickers, narcoterrorists, and their criminal associates their illicit 
profits and money laundering activities; and (5) assist foreign countries 
threatened by illegal drugs in strengthening their governance and law 
enforcement institutions.‖ Funding for counterdrug programs reflects these 
priorities, as the Bush administration increased the proportion of the 
narcotics control budget devoted to interdiction and capacity-building for 
foreign law enforcement and military agencies, reduced  the percentage of 
funds spent on domestic demand restriction, and resisted congressional 
efforts to place greater stress on promoting alternative development 
programs in source countries.242 
5. Barack Obama 
When he took the oath of office as President of the United States, Barack Obama 
(2009–present) inherited (among other things) the Mérida Initiative, much as his 
predecessor had inherited Plan Colombia from his.  Beyond the legacy plan however, 
Obama, has been generally wedded to maintaining high levels support to the same supply 
oriented strategy.   
Obama‘s first meeting with a foreign leader, even prior to inauguration, was with 
Mexican President Calderón.  During that meeting, Obama praised Calderón‘s leadership 
and courage in fighting drug trafficking and pledged to work toward greater cooperation.  
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Less than three months later, while visiting Mexico, Obama further committed to fighting 
the war on drugs alongside his Mexican ally, saying ―you can‘t just have Mexico making 
an effort and the United States not making an effort and the same is true on the other 
side.‖ He went on to promise resources worth billions of dollars over the next several 
years and committed to increasing the presence of U.S. border agents along the 2000 mile 
border.243 
Late in March 2009, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary 
Janet Napolitano debuted a Southwest Border Security Initiative to a Senate 
subcommittee.  The initiative was ―designed to crack down on Mexican drug cartels 
through enhanced border security. The plan calls for additional personnel, increased 
intelligence capability and better coordination with state, local and Mexican law 
enforcement authorities.‖244  The goal of the initiative was two-fold: first, to prevent 
violent spillover onto U.S. territory from the cartels. Second, it intended to do ―all in our 
power to help President Calderón crack down on these drug cartels in Mexico.‖245 
In keeping with the atmosphere of cooperation, steadily increasing since the early 
nineties, there has been a surprising tendency to acknowledge the United States 
responsibility for its share of blame in the narcotics industry.  The day after Napolitano‘s 
testimony, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton offered clear acknowledgment 
of the U.S. role in the crisis during an official visit to Mexico, ―Our insatiable demand for 
illegal drugs fuels the drug trade,‖ she went on to single out U.S. responsibility for 
smuggling of weapons from the U.S. into the hands of the cartels (a claim that is now met 
with considerable controversy) and pledged to seek $80 million dollars worth of Black 
Hawk helicopters to be provided to Mexico‘s law enforcement agencies.246 
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The cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico has certainly been positively 
influenced by the execution of the Mérida Initiative, but the implementation has faced 
hurdles.  Funds from FY2008 faced delays from contractual technicalities as well delays 
resulting from the challenge of coordinating aid from multiple government agencies.  The 
program faced further delays the next fiscal year due to the fact that the U.S. Congress 
failed to pass an appropriations bill until well into 2009.  Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports on Mérida showed that by the end of FY2009 only 64 percent of 
the $1.3 billion appropriated had been obligated and a paltry 20 percent had actually been 
spent.  After release of the GAO report, the pace of implementation improved.247 
After the first term of the Mérida Initiative ran its course, the Obama and 
Calderón administrations agreed to a new framework referred to as ―Mérida 2.0.‖  The 
new agreement ―broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on 
institution-building than on technology and equipment transfers. The Obama 
Administration outlined the strategy in its FY2011 budget request, which includes $310 
million for Mérida-related programs in Mexico.‖248 The new program is based around 
four pillars: disrupting the operational capacity of criminal organizations, 
institutionalizing the rule of law, creating a twenty-first century border, and building 
strong and resilient communities.249   
Furthermore, in his introduction to the National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 
President Obama wrote:  
I am committed to restoring balance in our efforts to combat the drug 
problems that plague our communities.  While I remain steadfast in my 
commitment to continue our strong enforcement efforts, especially along 
the southwest border, I directed the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy to reengage in efforts to prevent drug use and addiction and to 
make treatment available for those who seek recovery.  This new, balances 
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approach will expand efforts for the three critical ways that we can address 
the drug problem: prevention, treatment and law enforcement. 250   
Taken together, the shift in focus in Mérida 2.0 and the ―balanced approach‖ of 
the NDCS 2010 implies a partial shift away from a supply oriented strategy, however, a 
look at the overall budget numbers indicates that the emphasis is still largely the same as 
ever. Supply reduction efforts receive almost $10 billion while demand programs get a 
little over $5.6 billion; a net increase of about two percent of the budget share for demand 
programs since 2009 and roughly the same overall split since 1996.251 
 
 FY1996 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 
Demand 
reduction 
4,571.9 5,416.6 5,259.9 5,600.2 
percent 33.0% 35.5% 35.0% 36.0% 
Supply reduction 9,211.6 9861.8 9771.6 9,952.4 
percent 67% 64.5% 65% 64% 
Table 1.   Portion of budgets devoted to supply and demand programs, in million 
(After Office of the President and the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, 2010, p. 109, and 1995, p. 67.) 
6. Felipe Calderón 
The counternarcotics options exercised by the administration of incumbent 
President of Mexico Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) are paradoxically both the same 
traditional emphasis on eradication, interdiction, and enforcement and yet completely 
unique in that the decision to implement the strategy originated from Mexico.  The 
military offensive unleashed against the cartels certainly looks familiar; high profile 
arrests and large seizures of illicit drugs are very much traditional markers of the supply 
oriented strategy employed for the last forty years.  The new and unexpected aspect is 
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that the decision to aggressively prosecute the war originated in los Pinos and pressure to 
participate was directed not from the United States, but at the United States.252  
Felipe Calderón campaigned for election as a PAN moderate on three platform 
planks: job creation, eliminating poverty, and getting tough on crime.253 After winning an 
extremely narrow victory over PRD opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, his focus 
quickly narrowed to the dismantling of the cartels as the centerpiece of his presidency.254 
―Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating DTOs a 
top priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug trafficking-related 
violence in Mexico a threat to the Mexican state and has sent thousands of soldiers and 
police to drug trafficking ―hot-spots‖ throughout Mexico.‖255   
Calderón wasted no time in repairing the relationship between the presidency and 
Mexico‘s military damaged during the Fox administration.  Questionable personnel 
decisions regarding Fox‘s appointments of defense secretary and attorney general, as well 
as ill-considered remarks about Mexico‘s army in the wake of 9/11 had disenchanted 
some senior military officials.  Realizing that their support would be critical during 
extensive military operations against the cartels, Calderón sought to improve military pay 
and benefits, declared his personal support for the military, and was able to capitalize on 
the military‘s professional reputation as he sent them to combat drug traffickers.256  That 
combat has involved over 50,000 military troops (and thousands of federal police as 
well); their goal to dismantle the DTOs by targeting the cartel leadership.257 
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Two possible explanations for the reasoning behind Calderón‘s decision are 
advanced by Francisco González.  One possibility is a political explanation which holds 
that newly elected presidents must perform some kind of spectacular act in order to 
enhance their popular image and gain political dominance within the political class.  In 
this particular case, that Calderón ordered the offensive against the DTOs in order put-to-
bed the conflict with López Obrador.  While this argument cannot be completely 
discounted, his second argument is more compelling.  The second argument is that 
Calderón recognized that the DTOs were becoming a dominant political actor in more 
and more territory; that left unrestrained, the cartels could increase in power and threaten 
state legitimacy as happened in Colombia.258 
Calderón had greater success implementing other programs that his predecessor 
failed to execute, particularly in the area of police and judicial reform. The Mexican 
judiciary is a largely discredited institution.  Poor protection for those accused of crimes, 
high levels of impunity for criminals, and low levels of public trust are reflected in 
polling data from 2007 that showed almost sixty percent of Mexicans did not have faith 
in Mexico‘s judicial system.  Considering an almost universal distrust of Mexico‘s law 
enforcement institutions, further surveys indicate that less than one crime in four is even 
reported.259  ―The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, 
inefficient, and corrupt.  It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention 
rate, and an inability to secure convictions.  Recent press reports citing data provided by 
the PGR maintain that the vast majority of drug trafficking-related deaths that have 
occurred since President Calderón took office have not been prosecuted.‖260  One would 
have to admit this is not a particularly rosy assessment of the Mexican judiciary.  Against 
such a bleak backdrop, President Calderón signed into law an ambitious four-part reform 
package in June 2008 aimed at making significant changes to the Mexican judicial 
system with a deadline of 2016.  The reforms address criminal court procedures, place 
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new and increased emphasis on the rights of the accused, change the role of police 
agencies in the conduct of criminal investigations, and significantly increase the ability of 
law enforcement and the courts to target organized crime.261 
The failure of the Fox administration‘s reforms in 2004 made the passage of 
President Calderón‘s 2008 reform package seem unlikely.  Consisting of four elements 
(three of which lifted almost directly from the Fox plan): changes to criminal proceedings 
including new oral, adversarial procedures, alternative sentencing, and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms; greater emphasis on the rights of the accused; 
modifications to police agencies and their role in criminal investigations; and tougher 
measures for combating organized crime, the package was approved by the Mexican 
Congress in 2008 after receiving considerable support from the legal community, 
academia and human rights organizations.  There was also considerable public support 
stemming from significantly increased levels of violence in the two years leading up to 
the proposal.262  In addition to congressional support (which was nearly unanimous in the 
Chamber of Deputies and just under a three-fourths majority in the Senate), the 
constitutional changes required a majority approval of the thirty-two state legislatures as 
well.263  
The changes to criminal proceedings most significantly alter the nature of the trial 
system, changing from an inquisitorial to an adversarial model, similar to that of the U.S., 
Germany and Chile.  Other changes under this rubric such as the alternative sentencing 
(read ―plea bargaining‖) and ADR are intended to streamline the system by reducing the 
number of trials that actually go to trial and reduce the backlog in the system.264 
Those reforms focused on the rights of the accused provide stronger constitutional 
protection of the presumption of innocence, require the physical presence of judges at any 
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proceeding wherein a defendant is involved, and bolster safeguards to due process for the 
accused including the right to an attorney and specific prohibition on the use of torture.265 
Perhaps less glamorous than the courtroom changes, those reforms of police 
procedures are of equal consequence.  Reforms are aimed at greater integration of police 
into the judicial process.  They are also intended to increase communication and 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies.  Despite the allowed phase-in period, 
many of the police reforms have already been adopted.266 
The fourth tier of the reform package is intended to combat the growing scourge 
of organized crime. ―In cases involving organized crime, the Mexican constitution has 
now been amended to allow for the sequestering of suspects under ―arraigo‖ (literally, to 
―root‖ someone, i.e., to hold firmly) for up to 40 days without criminal charges (with 
possible extension of an additional 40 days, up to a total of 80 days).‖267  The 2008 
reforms also provide for additional tools in the fight against organized crime including 
the use of wiretaps.  Laws passed in 2009 as complement to the reform package allow the 
PGR the discretion to determine when a suspect is involved in organized crime.268 
Currently three years into an eight-year plan, implementation has been uneven.  
Critics argue both ends against the middle; some saying the reforms try to do too much, 
others that they do not go far enough.  This section will examine those concerns and 
attempt to explain what caused the reforms as well as their timing. 
The ambitious plan will require significant investment of time, money and effort. 
Current laws and procedures will be revised at the federal and state levels, infrastructure 
changes are required, training must be conducted for legal professionals at every level 
(including police), and public relations and education campaigns will aim at informing 
the citizenry of the changes.  Federal and state governments have until 2016 to fully 
adopt the changes. With the exception of the aforementioned police reforms, 
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implementation to date is proceeding faster at the local and state level than at the federal 
level. After congressional approval was secured on approved March 6, 2008, the reforms 
officially became the law of the land on June 18, 2008.269  As of May 2010, reforms had 
been implemented in 13 of 32 Mexican States.270 
In spite of the considerable support for the reforms, there are concerns.  
Considering the relative similarities between the Fox and Calderón reforms, it should 
come as no surprise that some of the concerns are familiar.  While recognizing that there 
is need for change, some are concerned that the reform package is too heavily influenced 
by legal scholars unfamiliar with Mexico; that lacking intimate understanding, the 
juridical principles proposed may not ―translate‖ culturally.271   
Some believe that the reforms go too far. Critics like Mexican legal scholar 
Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona are concerned that the attempt to streamline the system (i.e. 
the introduction of plea bargaining) and the changes specific to organized crime may 
impinge on the rights of the accused.272  ―The 2008 reforms introduced new measures 
that may actually undermine fundamental rights and due process of law.  The use of 
arraigo—sequestering of suspects without charge—is widely criticized for undermining 
habeas corpus rights and creating an ―exceptional legal regime‖ for individuals accused 
of organized crime.‖273 
Conversely, others believe that ambitious as they are the Calderón reforms do not 
go far enough.  The reforms are much needed but will be expensive both monetarily and 
in terms of time and training.  Lacking continued and concerted efforts, as well as 
sufficient resourcing, the reforms may be a bridge too far.274  In fact, while there is 
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general agreement that the reforms will be costly, there is no real estimate as to what the 
final price tag will be.275  Others are concerned that without commensurate 
improvements in police forces, the judicial reforms will amount to little more than 
window dressing.  In other countries where judicial reform has been attempted, as in 
Honduras, corruption and inefficiency continue to be a problem276 
I contend that the intensification of the conflict with elements of organized crime 
is the key to understanding the reforms implemented by the Calderón administration.  
With almost 3000 drug related homicides in the first full year of his presidency and 
almost the same number by the time the reform package became law in June of 2008,277 
President Calderón‘s decision that defeating the drug cartels would be the top priority of 
his presidency278clearly was impacted by the spiraling violence of the drug war and the 
legal reforms were a tool to that end.   
The more difficult question to explain is why the measures for combating 
organized crime were included in a package that otherwise seemed to focus on 
transparency and the rights of the accused.  I contend that the majority of the reforms, 
while a significant improvement over Mexico‘s old, corrupt system were really the 
―spoonful of sugar‖ that helped the anti-OC reforms go down.  Procedural reforms that 
model U.S. courts ―represent little more than window dressing.‖279  The fact that the 
police reforms have been put into effect just two years into the implementation period, 
amply illustrates their relative importance. 
Why then, were the reforms able to pass in 2008 when a similar package failed for 
the Fox administration?  Again I look to the drug war to provide the explanation.  Simply 
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put, it wasn‘t bad enough in 2004 to make the reforms attractive.  By 2008, no political 
party wanted to look soft on the drug cartels; thus the reform package was supported 
across party lines. 
If the American press is to be believed, U.S. aid in the form of the Mérida 
Initiative is riding to the rescue of our southern neighbor.  In fact, some of the most 
aggressive and ambitious action taken in the drug war was implemented by President 
Felipe Calderón completely independently of Mérida and the United States.280  That said, 
Calderón is no dummy; he realizes that Mexico must have the U.S. as a partner in the 
drug war.  His actions in militarizing the fight, reforming the judiciary, and fully 
embracing the idea that the cartels threaten Mexico‘s security seem tailor made to appeal 
to the U.S.  For the first time in the forty year history of the drug war, Mexico seems to 
be trying to push U.S. policy in the bilateral relationship instead of the other way around.  
Ironically, the push is not in a new direction, but rather, in that of the United States‘ 
traditional preference. 
7. Concluding the „00s 
As the decade closed, the strategic choice of fighting a supply-side war was still 
largely intact.  Certainly Presidents Fox and Bush did not aggressively seek to change the 
paradigm.  President Obama has, at least rhetorically, recognized that the demand signal 
from the U.S. is an enormous part of the problem but his ability to change course has thus 
far been minimal.  President Calderón has not changed the overall direction of the 
strategy but he has, for the first time since 1969, genuinely seized the initiative.  In the 
concluding chapter, I will explain why the strategy remains unchanged. 
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III. CONCLUSION: POOR MEXICO, SO FAR FROM GOD AND 
SO CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES 
The story of Mexico‘s relationship with the United States vis-à-vis the drug war is 
a story of increased cooperation and political alignment, but it is not the story of 
successfully ―defeating‖ drugs.  The United States has clearly demonstrated a preference 
for stopping drugs at the source for what I would categorize as institutional reasons.  
From Nixon‘s Operation Intercept in 1969 to today‘s Mérida Initiative, the U.S. has 
consistently advocated the policy of eradication, enforcement, and interdiction when 
dealing with its Mexican partner (and its other partners in the drug war, for that matter), 
as favored by elements of both political parties, the law enforcement apparatus, and large 
numbers of the voting public .   
In the very broadest sense, counternarcotics strategies are either supply-oriented 
or demand-oriented, but this is almost too broad of a characterization.  Being a source 
country (or a transit country in the case of cocaine), almost everything Mexico elects to 
pursue would be classified as a supply-oriented policy, so claiming that its strategy has 
never changed based on the supply-demand dyad is an oversimplification.  Considering 
the nature of the problem facing them, even the complete elimination of domestic 
consumption (a hypothetical one-hundred percent effective demand-oriented strategy) 
would eliminate neither the billions of dollars of illicit profit flowing across the border, 
nor the fierce and violent competition for that profit.  In simple terms, internal demand is 
not the main problem in Mexico.  Furthermore, Mexico can certainly not enact domestic 
policy that would directly impact U.S. demand so the strategic choices available have 
quite simply been limited. 
A more interesting analysis looks at key elements that fall just below the two-
tiered differentiation of supply versus demand.  At that level, the key elements of the 
supply-side strategy have been eradication, enforcement, and interdiction.  Here, it is not 
an over-simplification to claim that the strategy pursued by Mexico has evolved, but has 
not varied.   
 76 
The course of that evolution has tended toward more cooperation and compliance 
with U.S.-preferred policies; increased commitment of manpower, materiel and money 
has been the norm.  Mexico‘s military has become steadily more involved to the delight 
of U.S. administrations. Early on, the army was only used to manually eradicate crops. 
Throughout the eighties and nineties, the trend was toward increasing penetration of 
military leadership into traditionally civilian law enforcement institutions.  Now the 
military is fully engaged; it acts as a law-enforcement agency in its own right while 
prosecuting operations analogous to a large scale counter-insurgency effort.   
Financially, as well, Mexico has increased its level of commitment.  The 
increasing budgetary obligation is amply illustrated by comparing Mérida to Operation 
Condor.  For its part, Mexico invested $7 billion in counternarcotics efforts concurrent 
with the U.S. investment of $1.4 billion in the Mérida Initiative.281  One could compare 
that to the scant $35 million Mexico expended on the cooperative 1970s-era operation.282 
Mexico has thus demonstrated its compliance regarding U.S. counternarcotics 
strategies.  Mexico‘s interests have been served, either economically or politically, by 
publicly standing shoulder to shoulder with the U.S.  From the sexenio of Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz through the presidency of Vicente Fox, Mexico‘s aggressiveness in pursuit of the 
drug war has been in direct proportion to the amount of pressure applied by the U.S.  
Current President Felipe Calderón has been even more aggressive in the pursuit of drug 
traffickers than prior Mexican administrations without any pressure from north of the 
border.  While this would have seemed unlikely twenty years ago (or even ten), I contend 
that it is a natural evolution based on the trend toward increased cooperation. 
Have the strategies employed been effective?  The policies employed by the 
governments of Mexico and the United States for the last forty years are almost 
universally evaluated as failures.  Prices of heroin and cocaine, for example, have steadily 
declined despite the presumed end state of supply-side strategies, which dictates that 
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prices will rise if supplies are interdicted.283  Similarly, purity levels of the drugs have 
remained more or less stable; again the expectation of a successful program would be 
significantly reduced purity of the supply.284  Levels of violence, especially on the 
Mexican side of the border have greatly increased.  Although some point to this as an 
indicator of progress285, it is hard to point at approximately 30,000 deaths286 since 2006 
and declare it as a ―win.‖   
The definition of future ―success‖ is clearly different for the two nations.  
According to the National Drug Control Strategy 2010, the U.S.‘s official goals are to 
seek to reduce illicit drug use and minimize the detrimental consequences.287 
Recognizing both the nature of the demand signal and the nature of the so-called ―balloon 
effect,‖ which makes the analogy that localized interdiction will push drug trafficking to 
another path like squeezing a balloon,288 it is unlikely that a policy relying heavily on 
eradication, interdiction, and enforcement could achieve even the modest 15 percent 
reduction in illegal usage targeted by the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy.289  
President Obama‘s strategy gives modest amounts of attention and increased funding to 
treatment, education, and prevention programs but if history is a good barometer, the 
experience of the Carter and Clinton administrations would indicate that real change will 
be difficult if not impossible to implement.   
Mexico‘s goals are more absolute.  President Calderón‘s assault on the cartels is 
designed to eliminate the capos, dismantle their cartels and limit Mexico‘s growing 
domestic market for narcotics.  According to a Brookings report, his objective ―is to 
convert the ‗war on drugs‘—where currently the federal government is directing all its 
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resources to destroying cartels—into a law and order problem that the police can 
contain.‖290 Accordingly, the article considers five metrics; number of intentional 
homicides, trust in traditional law enforcement and politicians, a free press unthreatened 
by either narcos or corrupt officials, ability to express criticism and community needs 
without fear of retaliation from OC, and removal of the drug kingpins.291 
Certainly, Mexico would benefit from such a result but the immediate need for 
Mexico is to break the back of the cartels.  The experience of Plan Colombia has shown 
one possible path to improved security, reduced violence, and reassertion of government 
control in previously ceded territory292 and some observers have compared the Mérida 
Initiative to the Colombian experience.293  It is, however, important to note that the Plan 
Colombia program was aimed primarily at eradication, while the Mérida Initiative aims 
more at interdiction and enforcement.  This and other differences (involvement of U.S. 
troops for example) make the Plan Colombia comparisons problematic.294 Vanda Felbab-
Brown proposes that the pre-Plan Colombia experience of the early nineties provides an 
even better analogy; that breaking the grip of the DTOs, as was done in the case of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels is an achievable, if challenging, goal.  She points out that the 
―success‖ was a double edged sword in that while the main cartels were disrupted and 
ultimately dismantled, the fragmented cartelitos left behind were much less powerful and 
less able to bring violence against the state but were still trafficking drugs.  She further 
cautions that the Colombian model (with just two major cartels) was simpler than 
Mexico‘s current situation so using either the model has limitations.295 Relative to the 
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current state of affairs in Mexico, either approach might produce a desirable result but as 
in Colombia, will be very expensive in both blood and treasure.  One cannot categorically 
predict the failure of President Calderón‘s policy but he has a difficult road ahead.  The 
long history of corruption in police, legal, military and government institutions may make 
a successful outcome a bridge too far.296 
The hypotheses proposed in chapter one considered three possibilities regarding 
President Calderón‘s program; first, that his was a new approach, a significant strategic 
change.  Second, that his strategy is more of the same strategy employed for the last forty 
years.  Third, that the Calderón program represents some middle ground representing an 
amalgam of traditional enforcement with new strategies designed to generate a new 
approach.  Based on analysis of the last four decades and the examination of the evidence 
of Calderón‘s program as executed to date, the most intellectually honest assessment 
would say that hypothesis number two is most accurate; President Calderón has attacked 
the cartels with a single-minded determination but the overall strategy has changed only 
by degree. I will hedge that answer by saying that the judicial reforms begun by the 
Calderón administration are unprecedented and if successfully implemented will likely 
have new and far reaching impact on Mexico‘s drug war, and beyond.  However, at the 
end of the Calderón sexenio, the execution of the plan will be a little more than half 
complete; if the next president doesn‘t support the continuation of the reforms and 
emphasize them as a priority, they could still be in jeopardy. 
Bearing in mind these observations, I make the following three policy 
recommendations. First, the single most important policy change that could benefit both 
Mexico and the United States would be for the U.S. to take legitimate action against the 
problem of demand from the U.S. market.  The U.S. should dramatically increase its 
commitment to (and commensurate spending on) programs aimed at prevention, 
education, and treatment.  Such policies are effective.  RAND Corporation calculations 
indicate that money spent on programs aimed at lowering demand (particularly treatment) 
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is over seven times more effective, dollar-for-dollar.297  Recognizing the political reality 
that dictates the commitment to law-and-order, such a change could not come at the 
expense of traditional supply-side enforcement programs but rather would require 
increased spending.  In austere fiscal environments, an additional five billion dollars 
spent on such programs will be difficult to find but in the end, the benefits enormously 
outweigh the cost. 
Second, the U.S. needs to engage in a serious national dialog concerning the 
legality of marijuana.  As pointed out by Mexico‘s President Calderón, U.S. policy 
regarding marijuana is schizophrenic.298  Still listed as a ―Schedule I‖ controlled 
substance at the federal level299, ―medical marijuana‖ is now legal in sixteen U.S. states 
and Washington DC, and thirteen states have decriminalized possession.300  The U.S. 
may not be ready to legalize marijuana (a measure to completely legalize marijuana at the 
state level was defeated in California in 2010) but the discussion needs to take place with 
real consideration given to the economic impacts (ability to tax the sale, fiscal costs of 
enforcement and incarceration, financial impact on cartels, etc.) and social implications 
(social costs of enforcement and incarceration, medical benefits, legal job opportunities 
on both sides of the border, ability to manage production and distribution, etc).  
Depending on the outcome of that dialog, the U.S. needs to present a united front on the 
issue, either uniformly criminalizing marijuana or legalizing it. 
Finally, Mexico should accelerate the pace of its judicial reform program.  While 
it is, in the strictest definitional terms, still a supply-oriented strategy, the creation of a 
more effective, efficient, and transparent justice system will reduce impunity, improve 
the ability to pursue organized crime (not only in the counternarcotics arena, but on 
multiple fronts), and enhance the legitimacy of a government that has long suffered low 
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levels of public trust.  Without such public support, the counter-insurgency efforts 
underway against the cartels stand little chance of success. 
At the risk of oversimplifying the lessons learned from a forty-plus year drug war, 
one comes to a few obvious conclusions.  Attacking the source of drugs, as desired by 
Richard Nixon and implemented (voluntarily or not) by every U.S. President and most 
Mexican administrations since, has not ―defeated‖ the enemy in the war on drugs.  So 
long as the U.S. does not deal with ―the elephant in the room‖ the demand signal from the 
United States will render efforts at eradication, interdiction and enforcement moot. 
Neither Plan Colombia nor Plan Mérida addressed demand side programs in the United 
States.  Ironically ―the money spent on the Mérida Initiative seems to have come at the 
expense of such programs.  The budget for anti-drug use advertising in the United States 
fell by more than half (from $140 million annually to $60 million…and the approval of 
the Mérida Initiative occurred concurrent with $73 million cut in domestic treatment 
programs.‖301  This despite the previously mentioned RAND corporation calculations 
indicating that money spent on programs aimed at lowering demand are more 
effective.302  It is more than a little hypocritical for the U.S. to point an accusing finger at 
our neighbors when our own house is out of order. 
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